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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The District Court correctly found that Section 14.5 of 
the Act did not transfer the burden of proof from the Division to 
the Appellants, but erred in failing to place the burden of proof 
upon the Division and in finding that Appellants arguments were 
inconclusive and unpersuasive as to, among others, the following 
i ssues: 
A. Whether Appellants were Mnonissuers" as defined 
in Section 13<12) of the Act; and 
B. Whether the Order issued by the Executive 
Director was in the public interest as required to be 
found by Section 12 of the Act. 
2. The Executive Director and the District Court erroneously 
found that the following items were findings of fact when each is 
actually a conclusion of law and each was an incorrect 
interpretation of law upon which the Order of the Executive 
Director is substantially based: 
A. Whether "a" or "anyM benefit to the issuer 
means the same as "for the benefit of the issuer" 
within the meaning of Section 13<12) of the Act; and 
B. Whether the Division's interpretation of case 
law from other jurisdictions is correct and persuasive; 
and 
C. Whether the meanings of "value" and "benefit", 
in Sections 13(15) and 13<12) of the Act, are 
substantially synonymous; and 
D. Whether the question of monetary benefit versus 
other types of benefits was at issue in this case; and 
E. Whether registration pursuant to Section 
S(l)(b) of the Act involves "minimal disclosure". 
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3. The Executive Director and the District Court, without 
competent, material and substantial evidence on the record, 
erroneously -found that Appellants were not "nonissuers" within 
the definition contained in Section 13<12) of the Act, in that: 
A. The Division did not meet its burden of proof 
with respect to such issue; and 
B. The Division's interpretation o-f the Act 
stating that the terms "issuer" and "nonissuer" are not 
exclusive is in direct contradiction to the plain 
language of the Act, has no basis in fact or law and is 
in direct contradiction to persuasive authority, which 
was produced by Appellants, from similar jurisdictions; 
and 
C. The Division's interpretation of the Act 
stating that "any" benefit to the issuer means the same 
as "for the benefit of the issuer" is in direct 
contradiction to the plain language of the Act, has no 
basis in fact of law and is in direct contradiction to 
persuasive authority, which was produced by Appellants, 
from similar jurisdictions; and 
D. The Division's interpretation of the Act 
stating that intangible benefits are sufficient and 
that there is no intentional or agency requirement in 
the language "for the benefit of the issuer" is in 
direct contradiction to the plain language of the Act, 
has no basis in fact or law and is in direct 
contradiction to persuasive authority, which was 
produced by Appellants, from similar jurisdictions; and 
E. No evidence exists on the record to show that 
the transactions in question were for the benefit of 
the issuers of the securities, nor that benefits would 
accrue to the issuers within the meaning of Section 
13<12> of the Act, nor that Appellants are not 
"nonissuers" within the meaning of Section 13<12) of 
the Act. 
4. The Executive Director and the District Court erroneously 
determined that no decision was necessary with respect to Count 
II of the Pet i t i ons of the Division (whether the securities 
were received by Appellants in transactions exempt from 
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registration under the Act), in that* 
A. The receipt of the securities in a registered 
or exempt transaction is a condition precedent to the 
resale of such securities pursuant to registration by 
notification under Section 8(l)(b) of the Act; and 
B. The outstanding allegations that there were 
sales of unregistered and nonexempt securities, which 
could constitute violations of Section 7 of the Act, 
harms, damages and are prejudicial to Appellants as 
well as the issuers of the securities (which were not 
made parties to these proceedings by the Division), and 
are not moot in that such persons must continually 
disclose these allegations in numerous present and 
future documents involving state and federal securities 
and corporate matters and in that such outstanding 
allegations harm the reputations of Appellants and 
issuers; and 
C. Section 12<2) of the Act mandates that the 
Executive Director affirm, modify, or vacate the order 
or extend it until final determination. 
5. The Executive Director and the District Court erroneously 
failed to find for Appellants as to Count II of the Pet i t i ons 
of the Division despite the fact that Appellants met their burden 
of proof as to the following: 
A. The sales of the securities from the issuers to 
the Appellants were both private transactions and 
isolated transactions within the meaning of Sections 
14<2)<n) and 14<2)<a) of the Act; and 
B. The sales of securities pursuant to exemptions 
could not be "integrated" with the subsequent 
distributions of those securities pursuant to effective 
registration statements in order to disallow such 
exemptions; and 
C. The sales of securities to Appellants were not 
part of a series of transactions intended to distribute 
securities to the public wi thout registration 
pursuant the Act. 
6. The Executive Director and the District Court erroneously 
decided issues of law that were never raised by the Pet i t i ons 
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of the Division, the Pre-Hearino Order, the Bri ef of the 
Division, or any other pleading or documents on the record and 
which were not considered issues pursuant to the 
Pre-Hear i no Order, and supported their interpretation of 
these issues of law and their decision that Appellants did not 
fall within the definition of Mnonissuer" with facts never 
contained in the pleadings and not contained on the record 
thereby depriving Appellants of the prior notice and opportunity 
for hearing required by Section 12 of the Act. Such issues 
i nclude: 
A. Whether "any" benefit is sufficient as to 
Section 1 3 U 2 ) ; and 
B. Whether registration by notification involves 
"minimal disclosure"; and 
C. Whether Appellants" registration statements 
involved "minimal disclosure"; and 
D. Whether the proposed transactions would 
"create" markets for the shares; and 
E. Whether the shares which might be distributed 
in the proposed transactions would be immediately 
publicly tradeable; and 
F. Whether the proposed transactions are 
"i nev i table"; and 
6. Whether the purposes for which the subsidiaries 
were formed were "vague"; and 
H. Whether the capitalization of the subsidiaries 
or their corporate purposes are relevant to the instant 
issues; and 
I. Whether there is a business reason for the 
proposed dividends; and 
J. Whether the reason for the proposed 
transactions is relevant to the instant issues; and 
K. Whether registration by notification "subverts" 
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the purposes of the Act; and 
L. Whether the Executive Director could classify 
Petitioners as "co-issuers" or "constructive issuers". 
7. The Executive Director incorrectly found the Order to 
be in the "public interest" and the District Court erroneously 
found that the Division had met its burden of proof as to this 
issue by finding that the Executive Director could choose to 
claim it is in the public interest to deny the registration, in 
that! 
A. A finding that the Order is in the public 
interest is an essential element in order for the 
Executive Director to exercise his power pursuant to 
Section 12 of the Act; and 
B. The Division failed to meet its burden of proof 
as to whether such Order was in the public interest, in 
that: 
(1) The Division did not plead the 
public interest in its Pet i t i ons; and 
(2) The Division did not produce any 
facts showing that the Order was in the 
public interest; and 
<3) The Division did not produce any 
statute or any determinative or persuasive 
case law showing that it was in the public 
interest; and 
<4> The Division never argued in any 
document or in the Pre-hearing Conference 
that the Order was in the public 
interest; and 
Ce A mere unsupported allegation by the Executive 
Director that an Order is in the public interest is 
insufficient to sustain such Order on review in that 
the Executive Director must show substantial evidence 
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on the record to sustain such a finding. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Statutes whose interpretations are determinative of the 
issues in this case are listed below, and because of their 
length, are reproduced in their entirety in EXHIBIT A hereto. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1 Fraud unlawful. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-8 Regi str :.
 w» on by 
not i f i cat i on. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-12 Stop order. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-13 Definitions. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-14.5 Burden of 
Prov i ng 
Exempt i on. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants are both publicly-held corporations (Record at 
566). In early 1984, Appellants each caused the formation of a 
corporation and thereafter acquired all of the stock of such 
corporation, making each a wholly-owned subsidiary of that 
Appellant (Record at 440 and 318). The subsidiaries were each 
formed for the purpose of pursuing a narrower area of investment 
than the parent (Record at 440 and 318). Subsequent to the 
formation of the subsidiaries, the Boards of Directors of the 
Appellants each voted to place a resolution before its 
shareholders to determine whether all of the shares of the 
subsidiary should be distributed to the shareholders of the 
Page 10 
Appellant as a partial liquidating dividend (Record at 322 and 
444). The Appellants were advised by counsel that the vote of 
the shareholders followed by the distribution of the 
subsidiaries' shares would constitute sales of securities under 
the Act. The Boards of Directors of the Appellants then resolved 
to register the shares of the subsidiaries in compliance with the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act (Utah Code Ann. Title 1, Chapter 1, 
as amended 1983, herein the "Act") (Record at 322 and 444). 
On February 15, 1984, Appellants each filed an application 
and registration statement with the Utah Securities Division 
(herein the "Division") to register securities pursuant to 
Section 3(l)(b) of the Act (Record at 312 and 434). 
With respect to each application: 
(a) The issuer was a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Appellant (Record at 440, 313, 566); and 
(b) The issuer had no operating history or 
business experience (Record at 318 and 440); and 
(c) The consideration received from Appellant was 
the issuer's sole asset (Record at 318 and 440); and 
(d) Appellant had not paid, declared or 
distributed dividends on its common stock in the past 
and no future dividends were contemplated at the time 
(Record at 317 abd 440); and 
(e) Each issuer and Appellant was a Utah 
corporation (Record at 318, 440 and 566); and 
(f) The stated business purpose of both issuer and 
Appellant was investing in investments of all forms and 
nature (Record at 318, 440 and 568); and 
(g) After the proposed partial liquidating 
dividend by the Appellant, the Appellant may or may not 
own or control the subsidiary corporation (Record at 
568); and 
(h) Neither the Appellant nor the issuer would 
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receive any cash consideration, renumeration, or 
commissions, directly or indirectly, from the proposed 
distribution of the common stock of the issuer to the 
shareholders of the Appellant (Record at 567); and 
<i) The purpose of creating the issuer, was to 
have a subsidiary to pursue a narrower area of 
investments and acquisitions than Appellant (Record at 
318 and 440). 
Each of the Appellant corporations acquired the shares of 
their respective subsidiary corporations in a transaction which: 
(a) Involved only the two corporate parties; and 
(b) Involved no offer or sale of securitites to 
the publi c; and 
(c) Involved no advertising or general 
soli c i tat i on; and 
(d) Constituted the only issuance of stock of the 
subsidiary since the inception of the subsidiary; and 
(e) Allowed access of the Appellant corporation to 
all of the books, records and other information with 
respect to the subsidiary corporation (Record at 567). 
Registration pursuant to Section 8(l)(b) of the Act is 
available where an application is filed on behalf of a nonissuer 
who received the securities in a transaction which was either 
registered or exempt from registration pursuant to the Act. On 
February 17, 1984 the Division, by and through its Director John 
B. Hiatt, issued Pet i t ions (Record at 340 and 462 and 
attached hereto as EXHIBIT B) and the Utah Department of Business 
Regulation, by and through its Administrative Law Judge, Kent L. 
Walgren, issued Orders to Show Cause. Notices of 
Fre-Hear i no Conference, (Record at 345 through 467) and 
untitled documents stating that a hearing would be held on March 
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5, 1984 with respect to each of Appellants' applications to 
register (Record at 347 and 469). Each Pet i t i on alleged 
<1) Appellant was not eligible to register-
securities pursuant to Section 8<l)<b) of the Act 
because Appellant was not a "nonissuer" within the 
meaning of Section 13<12> of the Act; and 
(2) Appellant was not eligible to register-
securities pursuant to Section 8(l)(b) of the Act 
because Appellant had not received the securities in a 
transaction which had been registered or had been 
exempt from registration pursuant to the Act; and 
<3) The application should be denied pursuant to 
Section 12(l)(e) of the Act because the proposed 
transaction had tended to work a fraud or would so 
operate (Record at 340 through 344 and 462 through 
416). 
On February 17, 1984 Appellants requested in writing that 
hearings on these Pet i t i ons be held within 15 days pursuant 
to Section 12 of the Act (Record at 557). On February 24, 1934 
Appellants were informed that no hearings would be held on March 
5, 1984, that pre-hearing conferences would be held instead on 
that date, and that at that time hearing dates would be set 
(Record at 349 and 471). On March 5, 1984 a Pre-hearing 
Conference was held with respect to these matters and the 
Administrative Law Judge accepted St i pulat i ons as to facts 
(Record at 565 through 573 and attached hereto as EXHIBIT C) and 
later entered a Pre-Hearino Order as to these matters (Record 
at 574 through 576 and attached hereto as EXHIBIT D ) . The 
Fre-HearinQ Order stated that "the only 'benefit' 
contemplated in Count I was the benefit to the issuer of the 
shares becoming public" (Record at 575) and that "Count II was 
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being pursued only on an 'integration theory'" <Record at 575). 
The Pre-Hearino Order further stated that Count III, which 
alleged that the transactions would tend to work a fraud, "was 
too speculative and the motion to dismiss as to this count was 
granted" (Record at 576). The Division had moved to amend to add 
a Count IV, which alleged that the transactions would tend to 
work a fraud due to the failure to disclose all material facts, 
and the motion was denied when the Division agreed that it had no 
evidence that there was any material fact that was not contained 
in the registration statements filed on behalf of Appellants. 
Therefore, the Pre-Hearino Order found that the sole issues 
were limited to the legal issues of Counts I and II, as described 
above, and that these would be decided based upon the facts 
contained in the St i pul at i ons and registration statements and 
on briefs to be submitted by the parties (Record at 576). 
On April 17, 1984 the Executive Director of the Department of 
Business Regulation (herein the "Executive Director"), with the 
approval of the Securities Advisory Board, issued Fi ndi nos 
of Fact. Conclusions of Law and an Order (Record at 634 
through 645 and attached hereto as EXHIBIT E) denying 
effectiveness to the registration statements of Appellants. On 
June 12, 1984 Appellants filed a Pet i t i on in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County (herein the "District 
Court") for review of the Findinos of Fact. Conclusions of 
Law and Order (herein the "Order") issued on April 17, 
1984 (Record at 2 ) . On January 30, 1985 the Hon. David B. Dee, 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County issued a 
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Memorandum Dec i si on (Record at 6A6 and attached hereto as 
EXHIBIT F>. On February 26, 1985 Appellants filed a Notice 
of Appeal from the Memorandum Dec i s i on (Record at 663 and 
attached hereto as EXHIBIT G). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Seven overall issues are presented to this Court for review. 
The first of these was a failure of both the Executive Director 
and the District Court to properly place the burden of proof upon 
the Division. The District Court correctly found that Section 
14.5 of the Act did not transfer the burden of proof from the 
Division to the Appellants but then failed to place the burden of 
proof on the Division and found that Appellants' arguments were 
inconclusive and unpersuasive as to, among other things, whether 
Appellants were not Mnonissuers" as defined in Section 13(12) of 
the Act and whether the Order issued by the Executive 
Director was in the public interest as required by Section 12 of 
the Act. By continually placing the burden of proof on 
Appellants, the District Court never determined whether the 
Division had or had not met its burden of proof and, as a matter 
of law and upon the record, it had not. This error with respect 
to the burden of proof permeates and is extremely material to 
both the Order and the Memorandum Dec i s i on. 
With respect to the second of these issues, the Executive 
Director and the District Court erroneously found a number of 
items to be findings of fact when each was a conclusion of law 
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and each was an incorrect conclusion of law. These errors were 
substantial and material because they formed the basis for the 
Order. 
Ulith respect to the third of these issues, the Executive 
Director and the District Court erroneously found that the 
Appellants were not within the definition of Mnonissuer" 
contained in Section 13<12> of the Act. It will be shown that 
the burden of proof as to this issue was upon the Division and 
that the Division did not meet its burden; that the plain 
language of the Act shows the terms "issuer" and "nonissuer" to 
be exclusive; that to fall outside of a nonissuer transaction, 
Appellants' transactions would have had to have been "for the 
benefit of the issuer"; that the only "benefit" alleged by the 
Division was intangible and speculative and was not a legal 
benefit as shown by persuasive case law from other jurisdictions; 
and that there was no evidence to show that the transactions were 
for the benefit of the issuers. 
With respect to the fourth of these issues, it will be shown 
that the Executive Director and the District Court erred in 
determining that no decision was necessary with respect to Count 
II of the Pet i t i ons of the Division because the receipt of 
the securities by Appellants in registered or exempt transactions 
is a condition precedent to registration by notification and 
because the outstanding allegations that there were sales of 
unregistered and non-exempt securities are not moot and will 
continue to prejudice Appellants in the future. 
With respect to the fifth of these issues, as to Count II of 
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the Pet i t i ons of the Division, the Executive Director should 
have decided, based upon the facts on the record and as a matter 
of law, that the original sales of securities from the issuers to 
the Appellants were exempt transactions under the Act. 
With respect to the sixth of these issues, Appellants will 
show that a number of issues of law that were used to support the 
Executive Director's decision that Appellants did not fall within 
the definition of "nonissuer" were never raised in any pleading, 
document, and are not on the record and were not deemed to be 
issues pursuant to the Pre-Hear i no Order. In deciding these 
issues of law, the Executive Director and the District Court 
deprived Appellants of the prior notice and opportunity of 
hearing required by Section 12 of the Act. 
With respect to the K^ery important and final issue, 
Appellants will show that the Executive Director incorrectly 
found the Order to be in the public interest, which finding 
is required pursuant to Section 12 of the Act, when in fact the 
Division had failed to meet its burden of proof as to whether the 
Order was in the public interest in that the Division did not 
plead the public interest in the Pet i t i ons, did not produce 
any fact showing that the Order was in the public interest, 
did not produce any statute or persuasive case law showing that 
the Order was in the public interest, and did not argue in 
any document or in the Pre-hearing Conference that the Order 
was in the public interest. In addition, the Executive 
Director's finding that the Order was be in the public 
interest was solely based upon the decision of an issue upon 
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which Appellants had no prior opportunity for hearing and which 
was a totally falacious interpretation of the requirements for 
registration by notification. 
ARGUMENT 
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND ON UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT. 
<An Overview of the Utah Uniform Securities Act). 
To understand the issues involved in this case it is 
necessary to review the Act as a whole, certain sections therein, 
and the background and reasons for its enactment. Both the 
Securities Act of 1933 <15 U.S.C. Sections 77a - 77aa, as amended 
(1976)) and the Act were passed as remedial legislation. 
Payable Accounting Corporation v. McKinley. 667 P.2d 15, 17 
(Utah 1983). The need for such legislation arose out of the mass 
speculations in the stock market in the 192Q's wherein investors 
were purchasing securities without having any knowledge or facts 
as to the propriety of the investments before them. One of the 
main purposes of both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Act was 
to provide the investor with adequate information whereby the 
investor could make an informed decision as to whether or not to 
purchase a particular security. The two methods of achieving 
this goal, which are relevant to this case, are contained in the 
anti-fraud provisions and the registration provisions of the Act. 
Section 1 of the Act states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, in connection 
with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, both 
directly or indirectly, tos 
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(1) Employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud; 
<2> Make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading; or 
<3) Engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
This section of the Act, known as the "anti-fraud 
provisions", gives rise to both criminal and civil liability. 
This is one of the most important sections of the Act because, 
notwithstanding any person having satisfied the other 
requirements of the Act, a person would still have both criminal 
and civil liability if any untrue statement of a material fact or 
any omission to state a material fact had occurred in connection 
with a sale of a security. A material fact has been defined as a 
fact which a reasonable investor might have considered important 
in the making of his investment decision. (See, e.g., TSC 
Industries. Inc. v. Northway. Inc.. 426 U.S. 433, 44? (1976) 
and Kin-Ark Corp. v. Boyles. 593 F.2d 361, 366 <10th Cir. 
1979).) 
The other section of the Act which is \^ery important to the 
disclosure purposes of the Act is Section 7 which states: "N3t 
is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this 
state unless it is registered under this chapter or the security 
or transaction is exempted under section 61-1-14." This section 
might be characterized as a "get them in the door" section of the 
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law. It provides for registration before an offer to sell or a 
sale. This provision of the Act requires any person who wishes 
to sell any security in a public distribution to provide to the 
Division the materials that it is going to provide to the 
offerees and, in addition, provides for certain minimal 
disclosure requirements. Requiring an applicant to register the 
securities with the Division allows the Division to have in its 
possession the information being given to the proposed offerees 
which, theoretically, would allow the Division to react promptly 
if said information was not in compliance with the anti-fraud 
provisions of the Act. By requiring the applicants to register 
in advance, the enforcement agencies could nip a potential fraud 
in the bud. Because one of the major purposes of the Act was to 
get the applicant Nin the door*1, the various securities statutes 
h*f,w been intrepreted over the years to encourage registration 
and discourage exemption from registration. Secur i t i es and 
Exchange Commission v. Murphy. 626 F.2d 633, 641 <9th Cir. 
1980). 
There are three basic types of registration under the Act. 
The first of these is contained in Section 8 and is called 
registration by notification. Two general types of securities 
may be registered under this provision. The first of these is 
any security whose issuer has been in continuous operation for at 
least five years, where there has been no default during the 
current fiscal year or within the three preceeding fiscal years 
in the payment of principal, interest or dividend on any security 
that requires payment of such, and where the issuer, during the 
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past three fiscal years, has had average net earnings equal at 
least 5% of the market value of the outstanding security being 
issued. The second type of security that may be registered 
pursuant to Section 3 of the Act is any security registered for 
non issuer distribution if any security of the same class has ever-
been registered under the Act or the security being registered 
pursuant to Section 8 of the Act was originally issued pursuant 
to an exemption from registration under the Act. The enumerated 
requirements under this section are less than those pursuant to 
registration by qualification, and greater than those pursuant to 
registration by coordination, the other forms of registration 
under the Act. However, it is IMPORTANT to realize that although 
the enumerated requirements of each form of registration differ, 
the anti-fraud provisions of the Act provide for full disclosure 
in all types of registration, because if a registrant does not 
disclose all material information or discloses false information 
it would be both criminally and civilly liable under the 
anti-fraud provisions of the Act. 
The second form of registration is contained in Section 9 of 
the Act and is called registration by coordination. This form of 
registration is available for any security for which a 
registration statement or a notification under Regulation A has 
been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant 
to the Securities Act of 1933. The disclosure requirements under 
this section are de mi n imus because an applicant is 
registering its securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and 
has to satisfy the disclosure requirements of the federal 
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securities statutes. 
The -final method of registration under the Act is contained 
in Section 10 o-f the Act and is called registration by 
qual i-f i cat i on. This provision may be used to register any 
security. It enumerates a number of specific requirements 
concerning disclosure. It is important to note that, once again, 
the anti-fraud provisions of the Act require a registrant to 
disclose all material information whether or not such information 
is specifically required by the registration provisions. 
An important point that must be noted is that the three 
methods of registration are not mutually exclusive. An applicant 
can choose to use any of the three for which that applicant 
qualifies. For example, a company which has been in existence 
for over five years and meets the other requirements for 
registration by notification, but is also filing a federal 
registration statement, could apply for registration by 
notification, coordination, or qualification. It is the 
applicant's choice which provision it registers under. The 
Legislature did not choose to make these sections mutually 
exclusive and defined them in such a way that a registration 
statement could be filed pursuant to more than one section of the 
Act. All methods of registration are governed by the anti-fraud 
provisions which provide for full and fair disclosure. 
With respect to Section 7 of the Act, that section provides 
that it is unlawful for any person to offer any security in this 
state unless it is registered or the security OR transaction is 
exempt under Section 14 of the Act. Certain transactions and 
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securities are exempt from registration, pursuant Section 14 of 
the Act because of the recognition by the Legislature that 
investors in these types of transactions and securities do not 
need the protection and disclosures provided by the registration 
process. Under this legislative scheme, one of the major 
purposes of the Act is to encourage registration and, therefore, 
exemptions from registration are strictly construed. 
McDaniel v. Compania Minera Mar de Cortes ETC., 528 F.Supp. 
152, 160 (D. Ariz. 1981). The courts have taken the position 
that in order to qualify for an exemption from registration the 
offer or sale must fall "squarely" within an exemption because 
one of the major purposes of the Act is to encourage 
registration. (See generally, Murphy. 626 F.2d 633.) In 
addition, although persons offering or selling pursuant to an 
exemption from registration must still comply with the anti-fraud 
provisions of the Act, a number of the exemptions require no 
pre-filing with the Division and, therefore, the Division has no 
advance knowledge of an offer or sale and is not in a position to 
act quickly to prevent fraud. 
The difference between registration and the use of an 
exemption from registration is extremely important to this case 
because of the way that the courts interpret the securities 
statutes in cases concerning registration as opposed to cases 
concerning cases concerning the use of an exemption from 
registration. For any of the three forms of registration, the 
burden of proof is the normal burden of proof which is placed 
upon the moving party (i.e., the Division). See, e.g., 
Page 23 
Steadman v. S.E.C.. 450 U.S. 91 (1981). The burden o-f proof 
with respect to the use of an exemption is governed by Section 
14.5 of the Act as which states MCi3n any proceeding under this 
chapter, civil, criminal, administrative, or judicial, the burden 
of proving an exemption under Section 61-1-14 or an exception 
from a definition under Section 61-1-13 is upon the person 
claiming the exemption or exception." In keeping with the 
legislative intent to encourage registration, the Legislature 
chose to shift the burden of proof to the person who elects to 
claim an exemption from registration. In addition, all 
exemptions are construed narrowly with the purpose of encouraging 
registration rather than exemption and all definitions are 
liberally construed so as to effectuate the purposes of the Act 
including encouragement of registration. McDan i el, 528 
F.Supp. 152. 
In summary, both the federal and the state securities 
statutes are remedial in nature and were passed to require that 
true and accurate information be provided to prospective 
investors so that each prospective investor could make an 
informed decision as to whether to make an investment. The 
Legislature provided for three forms of registration, none of 
which according to the legislative scheme is preferred over the 
other, and the disclosure requirements under all are, in the 
final analysis, governed by the anti-fraud provisions of the Act 
which provide that all material information must be given to the 
prospective investor. The Legislature also provided for certain 
exemptions from registration which are strictly construed and 
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further provided that the burden of proof is to be placed upon 
the person who attempts to claim an exemption from registration. 
The whole scheme of the Act was designed to encourage 
registration because registration provides the Division with the 
same information the prospective investor is given and provides 
the information in a timely manner so that the Division can stop 
a potential fraud early in its stages rather than after all the 
damage has been done. 
B. BURDEN OF PROOF 
/ The Order of the Executive Director, found that "the 
burden of proving an exception from a definition under Section 
61-1-13 is upon the person claiming the exception" (Record at 
639, 643) and he then went on to determine that the burden of 
proof in this case was upon Appellants. The District Court 
correctly found that the Executive Director incorrectly imposed 
the burden of proof upon Appellants pursuant to Section 14.5 of 
the Act (Record at 652). The District Court correctly found that 
the burden of proof had not have been shifted to the Appellants 
but should have remained on the Respondents at all times but the / 
i 
District Court then incorrectly appl i ed that burden of proof. J 
This is extremely important to Appellants' case because the 
burden of proof question permeates the Order and the 
Memorandum Dec i s i on. Specific examples as to findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are discussed at length herein, but 
the language throughout both the Executive Director's Order 
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and the District Court's Memorandum Dec i si on continually 
applies the burden of proof to the Appellants rather than to the 
Respondents. Appellants claim that they were within the 
/definition of "nonissuer", and not that they were excepted from 
/ the definition of "nonissuer", so that the burden of proof was 
upon the Respondents to show that Appellants were not 
X. "non i ssuers". 
A few examples from both the Executive Director's Order 
and the District Court's Memorandum Decision show that the 
burden of proof was continually placed upon Appellants even after 
the District Court found that the burden of proof should not have 
been shifted. The decision of the Executive Director states: 
/ . . . 'CT]he burden of proving an . . . exception 
from a definition under Section 61-1-13 is upon the 
person claiming the . . . exception.' (Section 
61-1-14.5) Thus, if in the proposed distribution there 
is any direct or indirect benefit to the issuer, 
Applicants do not qualify for registration by 
notification. We find that the effect of the proposed 
distribution of all outstanding shares of each Issuer 
(subsidiary) as a partial liquidating dividend to each 
Applicant's (parent's) shareholders is to instantly 
transform a closely-held corporation into a 
publicly-held corporation with the minimal disclosure 
requirements that Registration by Notification entails. 
Since the parent corporations' shares are held 
publicaly by numerous shareholders, and since e^ery 
qualifying shareholder of the parent would be 
distributed shares of the subsidiary, literally 
hundreds of thousands (in some cases millions) of 
subsidiary shares would become available for public 
trading. 
Record at 63? through 640. 
Thus, based upon the decision with respect to the burden of proof 
issue, it was then erroneously decided by the Executive Director 
that it was upon Appellants to prove that the partial liquidating 
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dividends would not transfer the closely-held corporations into 
publicly-held corporations; that the disclosure requirements for 
registration by notification were not "minimal"; and that the 
shares distributed, if they were distributed, would not become 
available for public trading. 
The Order of the Executive Director stated that 
"Respondents argue in their memorandum that any 'benefit' must be 
monetary and that since it has been stipulated there is no 
monetary benefit, Applicants qualify for nonissuer distribution. 
We find such argument unconv i nc i no." (Record at 640, 
emphasis ours.) Again the burden was upon the Division to prove 
either in fact or at law what would constitute a legal benefit 
under the Act. The Order of the Executive Director states 
"that the creation of a public market for the shares of the 
subsidiaries is a benefit which would redound to both the Issuers 
and Applicants, the latter being, in our fact situation, 
tantamont to co-issuers." (Record at 642.) At this point, there 
was an assumption made by the Executive Director that a public 
market in the shares to be distributed would be created when in 
fact there was no evidence put forth by the Division or on the 
record that such was the case. The decision also states that 
"Cn3one of the cases cited by Respondents on Pages 5 and 6 of 
their Memorandum deals with Registration by Notification and the 
question of monetary versus other types of benefits was not at 
issue." (Record at 640.) The facts are that the Pre-Hear i no 
Order specifically states that this is the on 1y issue 
with respect to these allegations and that the only cases cited 
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in either of the Br i efs dealing with the definition of 
"nonissuer" were those cited by Appellants, which were rejected 
by the Executive Director even though they were the only cases 
presented which dealt with the definition of "nonissuer". 
The District Court found that Appellants were "correct in 
claiming that the Division incorrectly imposed the burden of 
proof required by Section 61-1-14.5. They clearly state that 
they are not claiming an exemption under Section 14 nor an 
exemption under Section 13." (Record at 652.) However, the 
District Court then went on and continued to apply the burden of 
proof to Appellants. For example, Appellants argued that 
"nonissuer" and "issuer" were exclusive terms and that Appellants 
either had to be an "issuer" or a "nonissuer". With respect to 
this argument the District Court stated: "Petitioners' argument 
is unpersuasive for several reasons. Section 61-1-8 provides no 
language that states that the terms nonissuer and issuer are 
exclusive." (Record at 652.) Since the clear language of the 
Act provides for only two definitions, the burden was not upon 
Appellants to prove that the definitions were exclusive but was 
upon the Respondents to prove that the definitions were not 
exclusive. The District Court goes on to state: ". 
Petitioners also cite cases that they claim support the view that 
the definitions of issuer and nonissuer are exclusive. A reading 
of these cases does not provide any conclusive showing of the 
exclusivity of these terms." (Record at 652.) Again the burden 
was upon the Respondents to show that the terms are not exclusive 
and the only case law before the Executive Director and the 
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District Court was case law provided by Appellants which 
supported Appellants' argument. Therefore, the only reasonable 
and plausible decision the Executive Director and the District 
Court could have made would have been that the terms are mutually 
exclusive and that Appellants had to fall in one class or the 
other. 
The above are only a few examples of how, in both the 
decision of the Executive Director and the decision of the 
District Court, the burden of proof was continually misapplied so 
as to place the burden of proof upon Appellants when it should 
have been placed upon Respondents. In the succeeding section of 
this ARGUMENT, Appellants will point out additional instances in 
which the burden of proof was misapplied and in which the 
Division had not met its burden of proof. In summary, the burden 
of proof in this case should have been at all times placed upon 
the Division. Not only did the Division fail to meet its burden 
of proof continually throughout the proceedings, but the 
Executive Director and the District Court erred in continually 
misapplying the burden of proof by placing it upon Appellants. 
The error was materially prejudicial to Appellants because it 
permeates the Order of the Executive Director and the 
Memorandum Dec i s i on of the District Court. 
C. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WHICH WERE ERRONEOUSLY FOUND TO BE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, EACH OF WHICH IS AN INCORRECT 
INTERPRETATION OF LAW UPON WHICH THE ORDER OF THE 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR IS SUBSTANTIALLY BASED. 
The difference between a finding of fact and a conclusion of 
Page 29 
law is extremely important upon appeal. The Supreme Court, as to 
an administrative agency's interpretation of general law, applies 
a correction of error standard. As to an agency's findings of 
fact, the question on appeal is whether the findings are 
supported by substantial evidence. As to an agency's 
interpretation of a special law or an agency's application of its 
findings of fact or conclusions on ultimate facts, the appellate 
tribunal makes an independent judgment of the reasonableness of 
N the agency's decision. Utah Department of Admin. Serv. v. 
Pub. Serv. Com'n. 658 P.2d 601, 60? anH
 u li (Utah 1983). 
Appellants are appealing five alleged findings of fact which 
in actuality were conclusions of law and each of which were an 
incorrect interpretation of law. Each of these alleged findings 
of fact were part of the substantial basis upon which the 
decision of the Executive Director was founded. The errors with 
respect to each of these findings of fact are three-fold: <1) 
that each was a finding of fact; (2) that the Division had met 
its burden of proof as to each of these alleged findings of fact; 
and (3) that each was an incorrect interpretation of the law. 
Section 13<12) of the Act defines "nonissuer" as Hnot 
directly or indirectly for the benefit of the issuer." The 
Order of Executive Director states: "Ctlhus, if in the 
proposed distribution there is any direct or indirect benefit 
to the issuer, Applicants do not qualify for registration by 
notification." (Record at 639, emphasis ours.) The Executive 
Director also found that there is ai benefit to the issuers 
and therefore because there is a. benefit, the proposed 
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transactions do not qualify as nonissuer distributions (Record at 
642). The question is whether "a" or "any" benefit to the issuer 
means the same thing as "for the benefit of the issuer" within 
the meaning of Section 13<12> of the Act. The clear reading of 
the statute itself indicates that the transaction must be for 
the benefit of, the issuer. Normally when a statute is plain 
and clear on its face the plain and clear definition will be used 
unless there is ambiguity in that definition. State of New 
Mexico v. Sheets. 94 N.M. 356, 610 P.2d 760 (1980). Any 
ambiguity in the definition would require an interpretation of 
the statute and therefore an interpretation of the law. Any 
interpretation of the law would be a conclusion of law rather 
than a finding of fact. Therefore, this alleged finding of fact 
is truly a conclusion of law and is an erroneous conclusion of 
law as shown in "Issue D" herein (Infra. p. 33). The 
District Court erroneously agreed that this was a finding of fact 
when actually it was a conclusion of law (Record at 652). 
The second finding by the District Court was that the 
Division's interpretation of case law from other jurisdictions 
was not incorrect and unpersuasive. Again, the difference 
between a finding of fact and a conclusion of law is that the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah makes the final decision as to 
what is the law in the State of Utah and as to what authority 
from other jurisdictions is persuasive. The Division's 
interpretation of case law is irrelevant in the Supreme Court, as 
is both the Executive Director's interpretation and the District 
Court's interpretation, and is improperly treated as a finding of 
fact when it is a conclusion of law. 
Section 13<15)<b) of the Act defines MofferM or "offer to 
sell" as including "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or 
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a 
security for value." Section 13<12> of the Act defines 
"nonissuer" as "not directly or indirectly for the benefit of the 
issuer." The Executive Director found that the meanings of 
"value" and "benefit" in these sections are "substantially 
synonymous" (Record at 641 and 653). This finding of fact, 
rather than conclusion of law, was made without considering the 
fact that the two words were used in different places in the law 
to express two different meanings and that, had the Legislature 
intended the meanings to be the same, one or the other of the 
words could have been used in both places. In addition, this is 
an interpretation of the Act as set forth by the Legislature and, 
therefore, is not properly a finding of fact but rather a 
conclusion of law which may be reviewed by this Court to 
determine the law in the State of Utah. 
^ h e Executive Director, with the District Court concurring, 
( also made a finding of fact that "benefit" as used in Section 
13<12) of the Act was not limited to monetary benefits but could 
be expanded to include any benefit whatsoever to the issuer 
(Record at 640 and 653). Again, this is an interpretation of the 
Act and, therefore, is a conclusion of law and not a finding of 
fact and is subject to a final determination by this Court as to 
the meaning of "benefit". 
The last finding of fact which is actually a conclusion of 
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law, determined by the Executive Director and sustained by the 
District Court, is whether registration pursuant to Section 
8(l)(b) of the Act involves "minimal disclosure" (Record at 640, 
642, 643 and 654). The language of this section is clear and to 
make a conclusion that the section involves "minimal disclosure" 
is not only an interpretation of the Act and, therefore, a 
conclusion of law, but completely ignores the anti-fraud 
provisions of the Act which require that all material facts be 
disclosed. This is an erroneous conclusion of law in that the 
Janti-fraud provisions of the Act require e^ery registrant to make 
/full disclosure of all material facts even if these facts are not 
(specifically required to be disclosed by the registration 
^provisions. I There can be no "minimal disclosure" pursuant to any 
of the registration provisions of the Act because the anti-fraud 
provisions require that all material information be disclosed to 
prospective investors so that they may make informed decisions as 
to whether to invest in a particular security. It should also be 
noted that the Division's original allegations that Appellants 
failed to state a material fact or that Appellants made an untrue 
statement of a material fact or that the registration statements 
would tend to work a fraud were dismissed immediately since the 
Division had no evidence to support such allegations. 
To summarize, the Executive Director erred in making certain 
findings of fact that were actually conclusions of law and the 
District Court erred in sustaining these findings of fact. In 
addition, each of these purported findings of fact are actually 
erroneous conclusions of law and are not supported by any law 
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and/or -facts on the record. Each of these purported findings of 
fact was material to the Executive Director's Order and its 
finding that Appellants did not qualify as Mnonissuers" so as to 
be able to register by notification. 
D. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY 
FOUND APPELLANTS WERE NOT "NONISSUERS"f WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF THE DEFINITION CONTAINED IN SECTION 13<12) OF THE ACT. 
In analysing the Division's argument that the Appellants were 
not Mnonissuers" within the definition contained in Section 
13(12) of the Act, it must be kept in mind that the burden of 
proving that Appellants were not nnonissuers" is a normal burden 
of proof and, therefore, is upon the Division. The Division 
failed to meet the burden of proof as can be seen by its argument 
in the Bri ef, which is the totality of its argument as to the 
nonissuer question (Record at 581 through 584). In considering 
the nonissuer question the total evidence before the Executive 
Director consisted of the registration statements filed on behalf 
of the Appellants, the stipulated facts, and the arguments of the 
parties. In its argument, the Division did not cite a single 
case from any jurisdiction in favor of its position. In 
addition, it did not cite one fact from the facts of this case in 
favor of its position. What the Division did in its argument was 
make presumptions and jump to conclusions which had no basis in 
the facts of this case. It is important to review the Division's 
Br i ef because upon this Br i ef the decision of the 
Executive Director was made and was affirmed by the District 
Court. 
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The first unfounded conclusion which the Division made was 
that the issuers would be transformed from private companies each 
owned by one person, into public companies owned by several 
persons, wi thout reoi strat i on of their securities (Record at 
579). This argument is flawed in that: there is no evidence 
whatsoever that the issuers would be transformed from private 
companies into public companies, since the shareholders of each 
must first vote; and the transactions would not have taken placed 
without registration. In fact, the Appellants in this matter 
applied for registration and were denied registration by the 
Division despite the fact that a major purpose of the Act is to 
encourage such registration. This is not a case of a company 
attempting to avoi d registration but a case of a company 
attempting to register. 
Another unfounded conclusion arrived at by the Division, upon 
determining that the companies would go from private to public, 
was that there would be many benefits to the companies by virtue 
of becoming public, including: (1) an enhanced ability to borrow; 
<2> an enhanced ability to raise equity; <3) the possibility of 
establishing public markets for the securities; (4) the 
availability of a method of valuing the securities; (5) an 
enhanced liquidity of assets; and <6) the prestige associated 
with publicly-owned companies (Record at 582). These are 
fallacious arguments, even assuming that companies would be owned 
by a number of persons, because there is no evidence on the 
record or otherwise to indicate that any of these purported 
benefits exist in fact or would accrue to these companies. In 
Page 35 
addition, most of these benefits presuppose that public markets 
would develop for the shares of these companies, when there is 
nothing whatsover on the record to indicate that any public 
markets would develop. In any case, even if public markets did 
later develop, the shares which would be traded would have been 
registered with the Division. There was not any attempt, in this 
case, to distribute and create public markets for 
unreoi stered securities, but rather to register these 
transactions and to provide investors with full and fair 
di sclosure. 
In order for the Executive Director to have found that the 
Appellants where not "nonissuers" within the definition contained 
in Section 13<12) of the Act, the Division would have had to have 
proven facts and/or law which would remove Appellants from the 
definition of Mnonissuerw. Section 13<11> defines "issuer" to 
include "any person who issues or proposes to issue any 
security". Section 13(12) defines "nonissuer" as meaning "not 
directly or indirectly for the benefit of the issuer." It is a 
classic rule of statutory construction that when the statute is 
clear upon its face it will be interpretated in accordance with 
its plain meaning. (See, e.g., Sheets. 610 P.2d at 764.) In 
this particular case there are two terms at issue: "issuer" and 
"nonissuer". Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. at 947, 197?) 
defines "non" as uLat. Not. The common prefix of negation." 
Therefore, a "nonissuer" would be a person which is not an 
"issuer". By the clear reading of the language of the statute, 
the statute has only two terms: "issuer" and "nonissuer". The 
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Division has attempted to muddy the waters and has presented 
totally irrelevant arguments and case law with respect to other 
terms, which are used in the federal securities laws and in the 
laws of other state jurisdictions, which are not used or defined 
in the Act, including: "underwriter" and "control person" 
(Record at 583 through 584). In our particular statute, the 
Legislature chose not to create other categories and, therefore, 
the other terms are irrelevant to this case. 
Since the plain language of the statute is clear and since 
the Division was the moving party, a heavy burden of proof was 
upon the Division to show that its interpretation, rather than 
the plain meaning, was the correct interpretation of the statute. 
The only jurisdictions in which Appellants were able to find a 
term other than "issuer" or "nonissuer" was where a legislative 
body had created other categories. Respondents apparently were 
not able to find any and cited none. Based upon the language 
contained in the decision of the Executive Director, it is clear 
that the burden of proof was improperly placed upon the 
Appellants and, taken as a whole, it appears that the Executive 
Director concluded that the Appellants, rather than the 
Respondents, had not proven that these were two mutually 
exclusive terms. 
Not only did the Executive Director and the District Court 
err in failing to find that the terms "issuer" and "nonissuer" 
were mutually exclusive, but the Executive Director and the 
District Court also erred in finding that any benefit to \ 
the issuer means the same as "for the benefit of the / 
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issuer" (emphasis ours) and in finding that intangible and 
speculative benefits are sufficient benefits to remove Appellants 
from the definition of "nonissuer". A clear reading of this 
definition shows that the term "nonissuer" contains three 
elements: <1) a benefit or benefits; (2) which benefit or 
benefits flow directly or indirectly to the issuer; and (3) a 
purpose to benefit the issuer. In the instant case it was 
/"stipulated to that no monetary benefit would flow to the issuers 
/ 
\ out of the proposed transactions (Record at 567). The only 
\ questions before the Executive Director were, then, whether the 
j possibility of intangible benefits, i.e., the possibility of the 
issuers' stock becoming publicly-traded, was a "benefit" within 
this definition and whether the transactions were done for the 
purpose of benefiting the issuers. 
The only two jurisdictions which appear to have dealt with 
the definition of "nonissuer" in any detail are California and 
Florida. In fact, California is the only jurisdiction which has 
further defined "nonissuer transaction" to mean: 
. . any transaction not directly or indirectly for 
the benefit of the issuer. A transaction is indirectly 
for the benefit of the issuer if any portion of the 
purchase price of any securities involved in the 
transaction will be received indirectly by the issuer. 
Cal.Corp. Code Section 25011 (West 1968-1969). 
The rules of the California Corporations Commissioner amplify 
this provision by defining the statuatory term "purchase price": 
CT3he term purchase price as used in Section 25011 
of the Code includes only the specific consideration 
bargained for in return for the securities (which may 
include the making of a loan to the issuer); it does 
not include any remote, contingent, or incidental 
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benefit which may accrue to the issuer, such as 
(without limitation) the inducement to a person to 
become or remain an employee of the issuer or perform 
other services for the issuer, even though the motive 
of the seller or the purchaser is to obtain such 
remote, contingent or incidental benefit for the 
i ssuer. 
Cal.Admin. Code, Title 10, R. 260.011 <1968). 
In Goller v. National Life of Florida Corp.. 554 F.2d 
1349 <5th Cir. 1977), the Fifth Circuit interpreted these 
provisions of the California law. National Life of Florida had 
sold 56,800 shares of its own stock which it had held as treasury 
stock to Eugene Cuthbertson for a price of *10.50 per share. The 
transaction was financed in its entirety by Florida National Bank 
which held the stock as collateral for the loan. In addition, 
National Life of Florida made oral representations to the bank 
that it would provide a letter of commitment to repurchase the 
pledged stock should the bank have to foreclose on the loan. 
Cuthbertson then sold all but 13,000 of the shares to four other 
persons and paid the money received from such sales to Florida 
National Bank to reduce the outstanding loan. Plaintiffs argued 
that the two separate transactions were actually one transaction 
and that the reduction of the bank loan benefited the issuer as 
it reduced National Life of Florida's obligation to repurchase 
shares in the event of a default. The Court stated: 
Here, none of Goller's *74,550 was received 
directly or indirectly by National Life. Even if some 
other benefit was received by the corporation, such as 
a reduction in the required compensating bank balance 
or a decrease in its potential suretyship liability, 
that is not the type of benefit which makes a 
transaction other than a nonissuer transaction under 
the statute. 
Id. at 1352. 
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In another California case, Coutts v. Grant, 184 
Cal.App.2d 255, 7 Cal.Rptr. 431 (I960), where the sole 
shareholder of a corporation sold some of his shares, the Court 
found that none of the proceeds of such sale accrued to the 
corporation and that the seller could claim a nonissuer exemption 
from registration. The Florida courts have taken a similar 
approach and in Cain v. Solomon, 213 So.2d 35 <Fla. 1968), 
Plaintiff Cain contracted to purchase stock of Hobby Fish, 
Incorporated from Defendant Solomon. As part of the contract the 
Plaintiff was required to loan to the Defendant, Hobby Fish, 
*20,000 for its operational needs. Cain partially performed the 
contract and then refused to complete the payment of the purchase 
price and instead initiated an action against Solomon and Hobby 
Fish for return of that portion of the purchase price which he 
had already paid on the grounds the sale was void because it was 
in violation of the state securities statute. Florida law, like 
Utah law, provides for registration unless an exemption from 
registra*?WH is available. Defendants contended that the 
transaction was an exempt transaction under Section 51?.06<3) 
(Fla.Stat. 1965), which provided that a sale would be exempt only 
if it was not made directly or indirectly for the benefit of the 
issuer. Plaintiff contended that his loan did benefit the 
issuer. In finding that Defendants fell within the exemption the 
Court stated: 
We do not think that the statute means that the 
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corporation can receive no benefit whatsoever from the 
sale. It means, rather, that a sale shall not be 
exempt when an individual makes the sale apparently for 
his own benefit but in reality for the benefit of the 
corporation. It does not follow that because a 
corporation receives some benefit (in this instance a 
loan of money) from a sale of stock by an individual 
that the corporation is a real party in interest. 
Cain. 213 So.2d at 38. 
The cases from Florida and California are extremely important 
for several reasons. First, all of the cases reviewed involved 
exempt transactions. In each case, the burden of proof was upon 
the party claiming the exemption, which was the defendants in 
each case, and the courts in such cases strictly construe the 
exemption provisions and the definitions associated therewith to 
encourage registration and discourage the use of exemptions from 
registration. Further, all cases dealing with the f,non i ssuer" \ 
definition dealt with monetary benefit and there is nc> case \ 
law anywhere which states that any non-monetary benefit is j 
sufficient to disqualify a transaction from being a nonissuer J 
transaction. Finally, all of the cases reviewed indicate that 
although there may be a, benefit to the issuer, this does not 
necessarily take the transaction out of the definition of 
"nonissuer". It is only transactions which provide monetary 
benefit to the issuer and which are intended to do so that are 
removed from the "nonissuer" definition. Bel 1 erue v. 
Business Files Institute. Inc., 3? Cal.Rptr. 201, 393 P.2d 
401 <1964); Clejan v. Reisman. 5 Cal.App.3d 224, 84 Cal.Rptr. 
89? <1970); Davies v. Acware Plastic. 116 Cal.App.2d 798, 254 
P.2d 663 <Cal. 1953), Comment, California Corporate 
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Securities Law of 1968: The Issue of the Nonlssuer. 2 Loy. 
L.A.L. Rev. 87 (1969). As one commentator has observed: "the 
thrust of the "benefit7 provision appears to imply an intent by 
! the drafters that a finding of benefit to the issuer should be 
| limited to situations where some type of monetary consideration 
flows to the issuer." Id. at 90. 
It should further be noted that the jurisdiction which has 
considered the question in the most depth, California, codified 
the "nonissuer" definition, for the purposes of both criminal and 
civil actions, to indicate that the only benefit intended to 
exclude a transaction from the definition of "nonissuer" was a 
monetary benefit. The courts in California and Florida, and the 
California legislature, logically chose to limit the types of 
benefits intended to be included in the definition of 
"nonissuer". Without such limitation, almost any type of 
transaction involving securities would come under the definition 
of benefit and render useless the nonissuer provisions of these 
statutes. For example, any market transaction in the securities 
of a particular company could be said to provide "a benefit" to 
that company because market activity increases the liquidity of 
said shares and the public interest in said shares. This 
interpretation, that such "benefit" rendered the transaction to 
be "for the benefit of the issuer", would render totally useless 
Section 14<2)<m) of the Act which provides for nonissuer 
secondary transactions, and would ultimately mean that no person 
could sell the shares that they hold in any publicly-traded 
company unless said shares were registered each year with the 
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Division. Another example of the absurdity of finding that 
any benefit is the equivalent of "for the benefit of", would 
involve the "market maker" in the company's securities. Any 
brokerage firm "making a market" in a company's securities would 
certainly be consumating transactions which provide a, benefit 
to the issuer because, once again, the market-makig activities 
would provide liquidity for the shares of the issuer. The 
courts, realizing that many intangible benefits flow to issuers 
from all types of market transactions, have chosen to limit the 
definition of "benefit" to monetary benefits which actually flow 
to the issuer. By so doing, the courts have made the nonissuer 
sections of the securities statutes functional and realistic. 
Further, Section 13<12) in defining "nonissuer" uses the word 
"benefit", whereas Section 13<15)<a) uses the word "value" in the 
definition of "sale". A clear reading of the Act shows that the 
Legislature did not intend for the two words to be synonymous. 
Had the Legislature intended the words to be synonymous it could 
have used one or the other of the words in both sections. Using 
the word "value" in the definition of "sale" indicates an intent 
to have the word "sale" liberally and broadly construed to cover 
any situation in which value of any form or nature is received. 
Use of the word "benefit" in the definition of "nonissuer" shows 
that the "benefit" must be a benefit that was intended to flow 
directly or indirectly to the issuer and that the purpose of the 
transaction in question must have been to have this benefit flow 
to the issuer. The Division presented no evidence that in the 
instant case, even should becoming a public company be a 
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sufficient "benefit", the proposed transactions are intended to 
benefit the issuers. The evidence at hand demonstrates that the 
transactions are for the benefit of the shareholders of 
Appellants. Clearly, where the facts would not support a denial 
of an exemption from registration which is narrowly construed, 
the facts cannot support a denial pursuant to the registration 
provisions which are broadly construed to perpetuate the purposes 
of the Act. 
In addition to misinterpreting the plain language of the Act, 
the Executive Director intentionally ignored the persuasive 
authority from other jurisdictions which dealt directly with the 
definition of "nonissuer" because, he stated, these cases did not 
deal with registration by notification and dealt only with the 
question of monetary benefit as sufficient "benefit" within the 
meaning of the definition of "nonissuer" (Record at 640). But 
these cases are even more relevant and even more in Appellants' 
favor because they did not deal with registration by 
notification. As pointed out earlier, these cases all dealt with 
exemptions from registration where the parties were attempting to 
avoid registration. The burden of proof, therefore, was placed 
upon the defendants to show that they qualified under the 
exemptions from registration, and the definitions were more 
strictly construed than they would have been if registration had 
been involved because of the defendants' attempts to avoid 
registration. So, even in strictly construing the definition of 
"nonissuer", the courts have chosen, realistically, to limit the 
legal definition of "benefit". It also should be noted that 
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neither Appellants nor Respondents have located a case anywhere 
in the United States which has concerned the definition of 
Mnonissuer" and which has removed a person or transaction from 
the definition of "nonissuer" because the issuer received a 
non-monetary benefit. 
The Executive Director chose, rather than to rely upon solid 
law from state jurisdictions with similar statutes and with 
experience in these matters, to decide that the cases more 
similar to the instant ones are the spin-off cases decided under 
the Securities Act of 1933 (Record at 640). In both v _ ^ ^ 
Securities and Exchanoe Commission v. Harwyn Industries \ 
Corp.t 326 F.Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), and Securi t ies \ 
and Exchange Commission v. Patronics Engineers. Inc.. 490 
\ 
F.2d 250 <4th Cir. 1973) cert.den. 416 U.S. 937 (1974), the v 
courts were called upon to decide if a distribution of a
 s 
\ \ 
subsidiary's shares as a dividend to its parent's shareholders 
\ 
constituted a "sale" requiring registration under the Securities 
Act of 1933. Whether a "sale" within the meaning of that statute 
had occured was dependent upon whether the distribution was for / 
"value" . ^y 
In both of those cases there were three basic elements upon 
which the courts based their decisions. The first element was 
the existence of an agreement infusing new assets into the 
subsidiaries in exchange for the issuance of sufficient shares to 
insure the control of the subsidiaries to the new management. 
The non-public company was required to put its substantial assets 
into the subsidiary in exchange for majority control of the 
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subsidiary. The second element was that the balance of the 
subisidiaries' issued shares were immediately distributed to the 
parents' shareholders based solely upon a resolution o-f the 
Boards o-f Directors o-f the parents and without any shareholder 
approval o-f the transactions. In each case there was a contract 
between the non-public company, which would merge into the 
subsidiary, and the parent whereby the parent was required to 
distribute these shares to the parent's shareholders. The third 
element was that there was the immediate development o-f public 
trading in the subsidiaries' shares without the investing public 
having any written information available with respect to the 
subsidiaries as would have been the case had the transactions 
been registered under the Securities Act of 1933. In each case 
the parent and the promotors of the parent explicitly sought to 
establish a public market prior to the distribution being made to 
the parent's stockholders. For example, in Harwyn« 326 
T.Supp. at 949, the Court stated: 
NTRR(JKM) shares were listed on the pink sheets for 
March 18, 1969, more than two weeks before the 
distribution of the NTRR(JKM) shares. NTRR(JKM) stock 
was quoted in the pink sheets by ten broker dealers. . 
Murphy thus succeeded in creating public (over the 
counter) trading in JKM stock UITHOUT REGISTRATION, 
(emphasis ours) 
The Court goes on to state: 
. CSluch a market would develop immediately as 
a result of the spin-off was both contemplated and 
confirmed. Even before the first spin-off of Cleopatra 
(Academic) shares had been affected, counsel for Harwyn 
and the subsidiary were busily engaged in laying the 
ground work for public trading by furnishing essential 
information to the National Quotation Bureau. . . . 
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[lit is equally clear that in the case of each spin-off 
defendants had available to them all pertinent 
information with respect to the issuing subsidiary and 
its controlling stockholders and were therefore in a 
position to file registration statements setting forth 
such basic information as the financial condition and 
operating history of the subsidiary, the identity and 
background of the new managment, and the terms and 
conditions of the agreements between the defendants 
which formed the basis of the spin-off. 
Id. at 953. 
There are important differences between the Harwyn and 
Patron i cs cases and the instant case and, in fact, the only 
similarity between those cases and the instant case is that the 
Appellants in this case might have distributed the subsidiaries' 
shares as dividends to their stockholders. The most important 
difference concerns what the courts in those cases were 
attempting to accomplish. Prior to Harwi n and Patron i cs, 
spin-offs were accomplished under the "no sale" theory, as 
embodied in Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 133 (17 
C.F.R. Section 230.133, rescinded January 1, 1973), which 
provided that a stock dividend did not constitute a sale under 
the Securities Act of 1933. The effect of the "no sale" theory 
was that neither registration nor an exemption from registration 
was required and that the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities 
Act of 1933 did not apply because the dividend was not a "sale" 
within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933. Therefore, a 
company could provide any information, whether true or not, or 
could provide no information with complete immunity from the 
federal securities laws. 
In both Harwyn and Patron i cs the meaning of "value" 
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was interpreted quite broadly so as to bring the spin-of-fs within 
the jurisdiction of the Securities Act of 1933 and require 
compliance with the registration provisions and the anti-fraud 
provisions of that statute. In the instant case, the 
circumstances are different. Appellants in this case have not 
tried to avoi d registration. Appellants have not tried to 
avoi d the anti-fraud provisions. Appellants have not claimed 
that these transactions fall outside of the Act. To the 
contrary, Appellants have attempted to register these securities 
under the Act and to provide full and fair disclosure of all 
material facts to the Appellants' shareholders through the 
regi strat i on process. 
Another major distinction between the instant case and the 
Harwyn and Patron i cs cases concerns the burden of proof. 
Since the parent companies in the Harwyn and Patron i cs 
cases were attempting to except the transactions from the 
definition of "sale", the burden was upon them to prove they fit 
within such exception. This was indeed a heavy burden when taken 
in consideration with the broad, liberal interpretations that the 
courts had ordinarily given the definitions in the Securities Act 
of 1933 so as to encourage registration and full and fair 
disclosure. In the instant case, the burden of proof as to 
whether the terms "value" and "benefit" are synonymous and as to 
whether intangible benefits constitute "benefits" for the 
purposes of the definition of "nonissuer" was upon the Pivision 
and not upon the Appellants. The definition of "nonissuer" 
should be construed so as to encourage registration and the 
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Division's burden of proving that Appellants cannot register 
these transactions by notification should be an onerous one. 
In addition to these legal distinctions, there are major 
factual differences between the Harwyn and Patron i cs 
cases and the instant case. In the Harwyn and Patron i cs 
cases there were agreements to infuse new assets into the 
subsidiaries in exchange for the issuance of controlling stock to 
the new management. Harwyn« 326 F.Supp. at 952. In the 
instant case, there has been no infusion of new assets into the 
subsidiaries, by virtue of mergers with privately-held companies, 
nor has there been proposed changes in the management of the 
subsi di ar i es. 
Further, in the Harwyn and Patron i cs cases, the stock 
dividends were accomplished merely by resolutions of the Boards 
of Pirectors to distribute the shares of their subsidiaries to 
their shareholders. No shareholders' approval was requested or 
needed, no information statement was given to the stockholders of 
the parents, and from the basic agreements requiring the parents 
to distribute the shares to their shareholders, it was not in the 
slightest bit speculative to assume that the distributions would 
be made. In the instant case, Appellants have sought to register 
the subsidiaries' securities by notification so as to provide 
their shareholders with all material information in order for 
such shareholders to be able to make informed decisions as to 
whether to approve the partial liquidating dividends. Although 
management of Appellants, in the instant case, have recommended 
that the shareholders approve the partial liquidating dividends, 
Page 4? 
the shareholders, and not management, will make the -final 
decision as to whether the distributions take place. In order 
for the distributions to take place, the shareholders must 
approve the partial liquidating dividend by a two-thirds vote. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 16-10-42 <1?73). Each shareholder must 
then fill out a subscription agreement prior to receiving its 
shares in the subsidiary. It is speculative at best to assume 
that the distributions will even take place because management of 
the companies, the Division, and the Court cannot determine in 
advance how the shareholders are going to vote with respect to 
the partial liquidating dividends. It is at least as likely that 
the shareholders will determine that the shares of the 
wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Appellants should remain the 
property of the Appellants and should not be distributed as 
partial liquidating dividends. 
The final stage in both the Harwyn and Patron i cs 
transactions involved the immediate development of active trading 
markets in the shares of the subsidiaries without the benefit to 
the investing public of the disclosures which would have been 
made had the securities been registered pursuant to the 
Securities Act of 1933. Harwyn, 326 F.Supp. at 952. As 
pointed out earlier, one of the things influencing both courts 
was that the management of the parent companies, prior to the 
distributions, had taken all steps necessary to insure that 
public markets would develop, had distributed false and 
misleading information so as to cause active markets to develop, 
and had acquired the services of numerous market-makers to insure 
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active markets. In the instant case, Appellants indicated to 
their shareholders that no markets exist for the shares that are 
proposed to be distributed and that there is no assurance that 
any markets would develop (Record at 317, 429 and 43?). In 
addition, there have been no allegations made that Appellants 
have taken any action whatsoever to arrange for public markets in 
the shares of the subsidiaries and Appellants attempted to 
register the securities of their subsidiaries and, by so doing, 
attempted to make public all of the information required to be 
disclosed puruant to the registration provisions and the 
anti-fraud provisions of the Act. 
In conclusion, the only case law dealing with the definition 
of "nonissuer" limits the term "benefit" to monetary benefits 
which are intended to flow to the issuer. The spin-off cases 
cited in the Order are totally irrelevant and are 
distinguishable from the instant case in their factual 
situations, in the difference between the meanings of "value" and 
"benefit", and in the different bases for those decisions. In 
the instant case, Appellants fall squarely within the statutory \ 
definition of "nonissuer" because, as stipulated to, there is no I 
monetary benefit accruing to either the Appellants or the issuers 
by virtue of the proposed transactions, because the Division did , 
not meet its burden of proving that Appellants fell outside the / 
definition of "nonissuer", and because the Executive Directors 
interpretation of "nonissuer" would render the nonissuer sections 
of the Act totally useless. 
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E. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED 
THAT NO DECISION WAS NECESSARY WITH RESPECT TO COUNT II OF 
THE PETITION. 
Count II o-f the Division's Pet i t i ons alleged that the 
original transactions, in which the Appellants acquired the 
shares of their subsidiaries, were not exempt from registration 
under the Act (Record at 342 and 464). The Executive Director 
determined that Appellants were not "nonissuers" as the term is 
used in the provisions of registration by notification and that, 
therefore, he did not need to decide whether the original 
transactions were exempt from registration (Record at 643). The 
District Court found that a decision with respect to the 
"threshold question"9 which it decided was the nonissuer 
question, made the exemption issue moot and that it would be an 
unreasonable expenditure of the Executive Director's resources to 
decide a secondary and nonessential issue (Record at 656). 
Both the Executive Director and the District Court erred in 
this determination. Section 8(l)(b) of the Act describes which 
securities may be registered by notification: 
Any security . . . registered for nonissuer 
distribution if any security of the same class has ever 
been registered under this chapter or a predecessor 
' act, or the security being registered was originally 
issued pursuant to an exemption under this chapter or a 
1
 predecessor act. 
The proper threshold question is whether the securities 
issued by the subsidiaries to the Appellants were issued pursuant 
to exemptions from registration. This is a condition precedent 
to being able to use registration by notification. Even if an 
applicant was otherwise qualified to make a nonissuer 
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distribution under the provisions of registration by, 
notification, registration by notification could not be used if/ 
the securities had not either originally been registered under 
the Act or originally issued pursuant to an exemption from 
registration under the Act. 
Further, this issue is not moot because the outstanding 
allegations that there were sales of unregistered and non-exempt 
securities, which sales could constitute violations of Section 7 
of the Act, are prejudicial to both the Appellants as well as the 
issuers (which were not made parties to the action by the 
Division) and both Appellants and issuers must disclose these 
allegations in numerous present and future documents involving 
both state and federal securities and corporate matters. (See, 
e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation A (17 C.F.R. 
Section 230.252(c)(1) (1956)), Regulation D (17 C.F.R. Section 
230.505(b)(2)(iii) (1982), and Regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. Sections 
229.103 and 229.701 (1982)) and Utah Securities Division Rule 
14.2n-l(5)(c)(i) (1983).) 
Section 12(2) states that if a hearing is requested or is 
ordered the Executive Director, after notice and opportunity for 
hearing the Executive Director "may affirm, modify, or vacate the 
order or extend it until final determination." The District 
Court found that it was within the power of the Executive 
Director to refuse to make a determination as to the allegations 
contained in Count I because of the word "may" in Section 12(2) 
of the Act and, that if it were not within the power of the 
Executive Director to choose not to decide, the statute would 
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likely have read "shall" (Record at 656). A better reading of 
the statute is that the Executive Director is required to take 
one of the four enumerated actions. If this were not the correct 
reading of the statute, then pursuant to Section 12<2> the 
Division could by summarily postpone, suspend or deny the 
effectiveness of a registration statement, a hearing could 
subsequently be held, and the Executive Director could choose to 
do nothing. The Act must be interpreted to mandate that the 
Executive Director choose one of the four enumerated actions and, 
particularly in this case where Count II is not moot because of 
the irreparable and continuing harm caused to Appellants by the 
mere allegations contained in Count II and where the issue 
presented in Count II was the threshold question, it was 
incumbent upon the Executive Director to make a determination as 
to the merits of Count II. As stated by this Court in 
Deseret Sav. Bank v. Francis et al .. 62 Utah 85, 217 P. 1114 
(1923): "Cwlhen power is given by statute to public officers in 
permissive language, the language used will be regarded as 
peremtory, where public interest or individual rights so require 
. . ." idi at 1115. 
F. THE THEORY OF INTEGRATION CANNOT BE APPLIED TO A REGISTERED 
PUBLIC OFFERING AND A PREVIOUS PRIVATE OFFERING SO AS TO 
DISQUALIFY THE PUBLIC OFFERING FROM REGISTRATION. 
It was stipulated to by the Division that Count II was being 
pursued only on an "integration theory" and not on any other 
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theory (Record at 575). It was also stipulated to by the parties 
that the transactions between the Appellants and their 
subsidiaries: <a> involved only the two corporate parties; <b> 
involved no offer or sale of securities to the public; <c> 
involved no advertising or general solicitation; (d) consitituted 
the only issuance of stock of the subsidiaries since the 
incorporation of the subsidiaries; and <e> allowed access of the 
Appellants to all of the books, records, and other information 
with respect to the subsidiary corporations (Record at 575). 
Therefore, the allegations contained in Count II of the 
Pet i t i ons of the Division could have been decided, as a 
matter of law, in Appellants' favor. 
The theory of integration is a method of statutory 
construction of the securities laws which is applied to 
effectuate the purposes of such laws and to prevent evasion of 
the registration provisions of such laws. The theory of 
integration cannot be utilized to disqualify an offering from 
registration in view of the purposes of the Act. 
The theory of integration is one which has been expressed by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission with the concurrence of 
the courts. Security and Exchange Commission Releases 33-4434 
(26 Fed.Reg. 11896 (1961)) and 33-4552 (27 Fed.Reg. 11316 
<1962>). The theory provides five criteria which are used to 
determine whether two or more transactions are part of the same 
issue or offering and no one of the criterion is determinative.. 
If the transactions are found to be part of the same offering, 
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the result is often that an exemption which was claimed -for the 
offering is lost: i.e., if the transactions are combTnVd, the 
offering may have been made to an aggregate of more people than 
is permitted under the exemption, may have been made to persons 
who cannot qualify as purchasers under the exemption, etc. 
The theory has particular application to two exemptions 
contained in the Securities Act of 1933: Section 3<a)<ll) and 
Rule 147 thereunder, which exempt offerings made only to persons 
resident of the state in which the issuer is incorporated and 
doing business; and Section 4<2) and the rules and regulations 
thereunder, which permit private offerings by an issuer. For 
example, if a person claimed a Section 3<a)<ll) exemption from 
registration for a public offering made exclusively to residents 
of Utah and on or about the same time also claimed an exemption 
from registration pursuant to Section 4<2) for an offering made 
to 10 persons in Colorado, and the criteria for integration were 
met, the integrated offering would have neither exemption: 
Section 3<aXll> would not apply since there were sales to 
persons resident of more than one state; and Section 4<2) would 
not apply since the integrated transaction involved a public 
offering. The purpose of the integration theory was to prevent 
issuers from "stacking" exemptions in such a way as to evade the 
registration requirements of the Act. That is, the integration 
theory is applied to insure that offerings which are, in fact, 
public offerings cannot claim a group of exemptions in order to 
evade the registration provisions. 
The theory of integration cannot be applied to prevent the 
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registration of securities in that: the purpose of the Act is to 
promote the registration of securities and the disclosure of all 
material facts; it was not intended to be so applied, as 
evidenced by the position of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission; it would result in disqualifying most registrations 
by qualification and coordination; it has not been so applied by 
the Division with respect to public offerings; and it has not 
been so applied by the courts. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission, the creator of the 
theory of integration as applied to the securities laws, has 
adopted Rule 152 (17 C.F.R. Section 230.152 <1?37)> which states: 
The phrase "transactions by an issuer not involving 
any public offering" in Section 4(2) shall be deemed to 
apply to transactions not involving any public offering 
at the time of said transactions although subsequently 
thereto the issuer decides to make a public offering 
and/or files a registration statement. 
Thus, the Securities and Exchange Commission has affirmed 
that the private offering exemption is not integrated with a 
SUBSEQUENT REGISTERED PUBLIC OFFERING of such securities. This 
is not merely a technical exception to the integration theory, it 
is a practical statement of the limits of the theory. In 
reality, when a corporation is formed and initially capitalized 
by the incorporators, the corporation issues shares to such 
incorporators in a transaction which has long been acknowledged, 
on both the federal and state levels, as an exempt private 
offering. (See, for example, the preincorporation exemption 
contained in Section 14(2)(i) of the Act.) The corporation may 
then decide upon a course of action which could include the 
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raising capital in a public offering of securities. If the 
integration theory applied to this series of transactions, the 
corporation would be unable to raise the capital it needs to 
carry on its proposed business. In fact, a considerable number 
of public offerings are the result of just such a series of 
transactions. In 1983, the Division registered by qualification 
approximately 400 offerings, more than 90'A of which had only 
recently sold shares in a private transaction to the 
incorporators. In NO CASE has the Division EVER claimed that 
such private transaction was not exempt due to intergration with 
the public offering. 
While the agencies charged with enforcing the securities 
statutes have promulgated rules with respect to integration, the 
courts have only recently begun applying such rules. (See, e.g., 
Murphy. 626 F.2d 633.) In so doing, the courts have been 
cognizant of the fact that the integration theory is a gloss on 
the statutory provisions and that application of the theory must 
be in the public interest. In NO CASE has a court integrated a 
federally registered offering with a federally exempt offering or 
a state registered offering with a state exempt offering. 
Murphy. 626 F.2d at 643. In the case at hand, in fact, the 
Division has stipulated that the exempt offerings did not involve 
ANY offer or sale of securities to the public (Record at 567). 
The cases discussing and approving of the theory of 
integration do so only with respect to the possible integration 
of two or more exempt offerings. The few times the issue of 
integration of a public and private offering has been raised, the 
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courts have rejected such an application of the theory. In 
Bayoud v, Ballard. 404 F.Supp. 417 (N.D.Tex. 1975), the court 
was asked to integrate two public offerings of limited 
partnership units in separate limited partnerships with a private 
offering of similar limited partnership units. In rejecting this 
argument the court stated: 
The plaintiffs' "integrated offering" agrument 
rests upon either a misunderstanding of its normal 
application in securities matters or a misunderstanding 
of the legal ramifications resulting from its 
application. . . . In the final analysis, the 
integration theory fails to apply herein and, even if 
it did, nothing would be gained by the plaintiffs. 
[Id. at 424] 
Finally, the Division argues that such integration would be 
in the public interest. Such an interpretation of the Act would 
not be in the interests of either the public in general or the 
shareholders of the Appellants, for it would cause all recently 
formed corporations to register the initial capitalization 
transaction of each corporation in order to preserve its 
opportunity to later do a registered public offering. While the 
purpose of the Act is to provide for full disclosure to the 
public by registration of securities, the Act also balances the 
need for information against the burden upon the issuer of 
providing the information. Such a balance has resulted in 
statutory exemptions from registration where the burden on the 
issuer outweighs the benefit to the public. Clearly in the case 
of an initial capitalization of a corporation, which involves 
only the initial officers, directors, promoters and insiders, the 
need for registration is outweighed by the burden placed on these 
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new entities. These purchasers are the corporate promoters, 
officers and directors. If there is ANY information concerning 
the new entity's business, these persons are aware of it. 
Registration would serve no purpose and places an enormous 
financial burden on a new entity. In summary, the integration of 
the initial private offering of a coporation to its promoters 
with a subsequent REGISTERED public offering was not contemplated 
by the Act and would not be in the public interest. 
Even if the theory of integration applies in the instant 
case, the theory of integration would not find the transactions 
to constitute a single offering. Should it be determined that the 
theory of integration can apply to integrate the transactions in 
the instant case only two of the five criteria of integration 
have been met in the instant case and neither of the two most 
important criteria are fulfilled by the facts. Further, Section 
14.5 of the Act does not apply and the Division has not met the 
required burden of proof. 
Tne first criterion, whether the offerings are part of a 
single plan of financing, is the most important and most often 
relied upon item with respect to a determination as to whether 
transactions are integrated <See generally, Deaktor, 
Integration of Securities QfferinQs« 31 Univ. Fla. L.R. 465 
<1979>>. In the instant case, the transactions are not part of a 
single plan of financing for the following reasons: <1> the 
issuer will receive no funds or financing from the registered 
distribution whereas in the initial transaction the issuer did 
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receive funds (Record at 567); (2) the issuer has no control over 
whether the distribution takes place, since it is a decision of 
Appellants' shareholders (Record at 570), whereas in the initial 
transaction the issuer did have such control; and (3) the 
distribution does not involve financing in any manner whereas the 
initial transaction involved the capitalization of the issuer. 
Another criterion is whether the consideration received is of 
the same type in both transactions. In this case, the initial 
transaction consisted of a sale of shares by the subsidiaries to 
the Appellants in exchange for cash consideration (Record at 318 
and 440). In the proposed distributions, there is to be no 
consideration of any type (Record at 567). Therefore, this 
criterion has not been met, as has been conceded pursuant to the 
St t pulat i ons (Record at 567). 
A third, and most important criterion, is whether the 
offerings are made for the same general purpose. In this case, 
the initial transactions were made for the purpose of creating 
and capitalizing subsidiaries in order that the businesses of the 
Appellants might be separated into two corporations (Record at 
318 and 440). The proposed distributions are to be made for the 
purpose of providing the shareholders of the Appellants a 
dividend of property (Record at 444 and 322). These factual 
matters have resolved by the St i pulat i ons as to these matters 
and there has been no allegation or evidence as to contrary 
purposes which would meet this criterion (Record at 569). 
While the burden of proving an exemption is, by virtue of 
Page 61 
Section 14.5 of the Act, upon the person claiming the exemption, 
the section cannot be applied where the Division is attempting to 
obtain an order as to the registration of securities by one 
corporation by claiming that such corporation PURCHASED 
securities in a transaction which was not exempt. The 
registration provisions of the Act apply only to offers to sell 
and sales of securities, not to purchases. A purchaser of 
securities cannot "claim" an exemption since such purchaser is 
not required by Section 7 to have either an effective 
registration or an exemption from registration. Only a seller 
can claim an exemption from registration: only a seller would 
need to claim an exemption from registration. The sellers of the 
securities in the transactions in question (the subsidiaries) are 
not parties to these proceedings: they have not been notified by 
the Division that they are required to defend their sales of 
securities. If they had been, the burden of proof, pursuant to 
Section 14.5, would have been upon them to demonstrate that such 
transactions fell within the exemption provisions. 
There is no allegation that Appellants have offered or sold 
unregistered and nonexempt securities and there is no allegation 
that Appellants could in some manner be liable for the sale of 
unregistered and nonexempt securities by the subsidiaries. The 
burden of proof as to Appellants, therefore, is not as stated in 
Section 14.5 of the Act. The burden of proof, rather, is on the 
Division to show either that such exemptions were not applicable 
to the transactions or to place the issuers <the subsidiaries) in 
the position of defending such sales under Section 14.5 of the 
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Act. 
6. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY 
DECIDED ISSUES OF LAW THAT WERE NEVER RAISED BY THE DIVISION 
AND IN SUPPORT OF THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THESE ISSUES OF LAW 
USED FACTS NEVER CONTAINED IN THE PLEADINGS NOR THE RECORD 
THEREBY DEPRIVING APPELLANTS OF THE PRIOR NOTICE AND 
OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING REQUIRED BY SECTION 12 OF THE ACT. 
Section 12<3> o-f the Act states thats 
No stop order may be entered under any part of this 
section. . .without: (a) appropriate prior notice to 
the applicant or registrant, the issuer, and the person 
on whose behalf the securities are to be or have been 
offered; <b) opportunity for hearing; and <c> written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
This section provides that Appellants had a right to prior 
notice of the issues which were going to be decided by the 
Executive Director and a hearing thereon to present their 
evidence and their law. Morris v. Public Service Commission, 
7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P.2d 644 (1958), R.UJ. Jones Trucking v. 
Public Service Com'n. 64? P.2d 628 (Utah 1982), Mountain 
States T & T Co. v. Public Service Com'n.. 105 Ut. 266, 145 
P.2d 790 (1944). The following are issues of law that were never-
raised by the Pet i t i ons of the Division, the Fre-Hear i no 
Order. the Br i ef of the Division, or any other pleadings 
or documents in the record and were not considered issues 
pursuant to the Pre-Hearino Order and/or facts never 
contained in the pleadings and not contained in the record. All 
of these were materially used to support The Executive Director's 
denial of Appellants' registration statements. By denying 
Appellants' right to provide law and/or facts as to each of these 
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issues, the Executive Director deprived Appel1 ants of the prior 
notice and opportunity for hearing required by Section 12 of the 
Act. 
The first of these issues decided by the Executive Director, 
was that "au or "any benefit" to the issuer was sufficient to 
disqualify the Appellants from the definition of "nonissuer". As 
discussed earlier, the only authority in this country regarding 
the definition of "nonissuer", is from the courts of other 
jurisdictions which have acknowledged that not e^ery benefit 
to the issuer disqualifies a person from the definition of 
"nonissuer" nor is e^ery benefit "for the benefit of the 
issuer". As can be seen from the Pre-Hearino Order, the only 
issue of which Appellants were given notice was the issue of 
whether the benefit to the issuer of the shares becoming public 
disqualified Appellants from being "nonissuers". Given the 
Division's burden of proof, it would be incumbent upon the 
Division to show both that the shares would become "public" and 
that this was a benefit contemplated by the "nonissuer" 
definition. Had Appellants been notified that "a" or "any 
f benefit" would remove them from the definition of "nonissuer", 
\ Appellants would have had the opportunity to present evidence and 
law to show that this was an incorrect interpretation of the law. 
The next of these issues decided by the Executive Director 
was the question of whether registration by notification involved 
"minimal disclosure". The Executive Director uses the alleged 
"minimal disclosure requirements" of the registration by 
notification provisions to substantiate both its finding that 
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Appellants did not quali-fy as "nonissuers" and its finding that -. 
issuing a stop order would be in the public interest (Record at \ 
640, 642 and 643). Hauing no prior notice or opportunity for ' 
hearing on this question, Appellants were unable to present their I 
arguments with respect to the fact that the Legislature created ! 
three forms of registration none of which is mutually exclusive 
and none of which was thought by the Legislature to be inherently 
inferior to any of the other forms of registration. In addition, ^ 
i 
Appellants did not have the opportunity to point out that \ 
disclosure is governed, in the final analysis, by Section 1 of 
the Act (the anti-fraud provisions), which requires disclosure 
of all material facts as previously discussed. 
There is no "minimal disclosure" inherent in registration by 
notification because, in addition to the enumerated requirements 
contained in Section 8 of the Act, the anti-fraud provisions 
require that all material facts be disclosed. Further, the 
proceedings before the Division and the Executive Director in 
this case were not legislative or rule-making proceedings but 
were adjudications of specific allegations made by the Division. 
The question was not whether registration by notification 
involves "minimal disclosure", but whether the registration 
statements filed on behalf of Appellants contained the 
disclosures mandated by Sections 1 and 8 of the Act. The 
Executive Director, although not specifically stating that there 
was "minimal disclosure" on the part of the Appellants, implies 
throughout his decision that there was such "minimal disclosure" 
(Record at 634 through 645). Had Appellants known that this was 
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in issue, Appellants would have had an opportunity to produce 
evidence showing that Appellants disclosed at least as much, if 
not more, than was required by either the registration by 
notification provisions or the anti-fraud provisions and at least 
as much, if not more, than required by the Division pursuant to 
its rules and regulations governing registration by coo« -*i nat i on 
and registration by qualification. 
/ Another factual issue on which the Appellants did not get an 
opportunity for hearing was whether the proposed transactions 
J would create markets for the shares (Record at 628 and 630) and 
whether the shares which might be distributed in the proposed 
transactions would become immediately publicly-tradeable (Record 
at 628 and 630). These are both conclusions which have no basis 
\ 
in the facts contained on the record and which would have been 
hotly disputed by Appellants as having no basis whatsoever. If 
there had been an opportunity for hearing, Appellants could have 
put the Division to the test as to its burden of proving these 
facts and would have had the opportunity to refute the Division's 
proof. 
The next factual issue which the Executive Director decided 
without any basis was whether the proposed transactions are 
"inevitable". Had the Appellants had the opportunity for 
hearing, Appellants would have had the opportunity to use the 
facts on the record to point out that the final decision as to 
whether the transactions actually take place is up to a 
two-thirds vote of the shareholders of the Appellants and not the 
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management of the Appellants (Record at 570). This requirement, 
as set -forth in corporate law, makes it at least as likely that 
the transactions will not take place as that the transactions 
would take place. 
There were, in addition, a group o-f conclusions, including 
whether the purposes -for which the subsidiaries were -formed were 
"vague", whether the purposes or capitalization o-f the 
subsidiaries were relevant, and whether there are business 
reasons -for the proposed dividends (Record at 630), which, had 
the Appellants known that they would be in issue and a material 
basis -for the decision of the Executive Director, Appellants 
would have produced both law and testimony for the record on 
these issues. In addition, Appellants would have strenuously 
argued that the reasons for the proposed transactions were 
irrelevant to the instant case because Appellants had fully 
complied with the requirements of the Act and that the Division 
has no authority to "second guess" an applicant when the 
registration statement falls squarely within the requirements of 
the Act. 
The underlying issue which permeates the Order and which 
is a material basis for the Executive Director's decision, is 
that registration by notification somehow subverts the disclosure 
objectives of state and federal securities laws (Record at 630). 
This is the major issue of which Appellants were never notified 
and on which Appellants were ne^er given an opportunity for 
hearing. Had Appellants been given an opportunity for hearing 
thereon, Appellants would have had the opportunity to argue that 
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the Legislature had created three methods of registration, none 
of which it chose to make inferior to any of the other types of 
registration, and that each method of registration could be used 
by any person or who qualified. Appellants would also been able 
to argue that disclosure is not ultimately governed by the 
enumerated requirements of any of the registation provisions, but 
is ultimately governed by the anti-fraud provisions of the Act 
contained in Section 1 thereof. In addition, Appellants would 
have been able to argue that the only allegationss the Division 
made with respect to the anti-fraud provisions were contained in 
Count III of the Division's Pet i t i ons and which were 
dismissed as too speculative and a proposed Count IV alleging 
failure to state nonexistent material facts which the Division 
was not permitted to add (Record at 575 through 576). Appellants 
would certainly have argued that if the Division could not 
sustain the allegations under the anti-fraud provisions, the 
Divison could not then claim, and the Executive Director could 
not then find, that there was "minimal disclosure" or that the 
registration statements did not disclose all material facts. 
Finally, Appellants did not have notice and an opportunity 
for hearing on the issue of whether the Executive Director could 
classify Appellants as "co-issuers" or^  "constructive issuers" 
(Record at 642). Had Appellants had an opportunity for hearing, 
they would have argued that the plain language of the Act, which 
provides only for "issuer" and "nonissuer", on its face is 
exclusive. It would then have been upon the Division to prove 
that Appellants could be classified as something other than an 
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"issuer" or a "nonissuer". Further, while Section 24<1) of the 
Act provides that the Division may "classify securities, persons, 
and matters within its jurisdiction," that section so provides 
only with respect to rules and -forms and does not give the 
Division the power or authority to classify such items by order. 
Therefore, the Order is beyond the authority delegated by the 
Legi siature . 
In summary, the only issues of which Appellants were 
aware and on which Appellants knew that they had to provide law 
or facts were the issues contained in the Fre-Hear i no Order, 
The Executive Director decided other issues of fact and law, of 
which Appellants had no prior notice and no opportunity for 
hearing, and Appellants were denied their rights under Section 12 
of the Act, their due process under the law, and the Division and 
the Executive Director exceeded their authority under the Act-
H. THE EXECUTIVE INCORRECTLY FOUND THE ORDER TO BE IN THE 
"PUBLIC INTEREST" AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND 
THAT THE DIVISION HAD MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF BY FINDING 
THAT THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR COULD CHOOSE TO CLAIM IT IS IN 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND DENY THE REGISTRATION. 
Section 12(l)(g) of the Act states that: 
.[T3he executive director may issue a stop 
order denying effectiveness to, or suspending or 
revoking the effectiveness of, any securities 
registration statement if he finds that the order is in 
the public interest and that: . . . 
<g) When a security is sought to be registered by 
notification, it is not eligible for such registration; 
This section, therefore, provides that two elements must be 
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shown by the Division before a stop order can be issued halting a 
registration statement. The first of these is that the Executive 
Director must find that the order is in the public interest. The 
second of these that the Executive Director must find, when a 
security is sought to be registered by notification, is that it 
is not eligible for such registration. The normal burden of 
proof applies here and so it was incumbent upon the Division to 
prove by a preponderence of the evidence facts and law for each 
of these two elements. If either one of the elements is not 
supported by the evidence on the record, the stop order cannot be 
issued by the Executive Director and cannot be sustained on 
appeal by the court. 
The Executive Director found that the issuance of the 
Order in this case was in the public interest because "the 
state has a valid interest in stopping the issuance of hundreds 
of thousands of public shares with the minimal disclosures 
inherent in registration by notification" (Record at 643). The 
District Court found that, while there is noAminimal disclosure 
in Section 8 of the Act, "it would be appropriate to remand the 
order and require the use of the phrase 'minimal disclosure' with 
reference to the public interest be used in the context of a 
specific statute rather than in a general way." (Record at 655.) 
The Distict Court went on to find that "the use of the phrase 
minimal disclosure was not a significant element of the 
Division's findings" (Record at 655). The Distict Court 
finished by stating "if the Director chooses to claim it is in 
the public interest to deny the registration of petitioners, he 
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may do so." (Record at 660-661.) The Executive Director erred 
in the first instance, and the District Court compounded the 
error, in two ways. In the Executive Director's decision, the 
only justification for the finding that a stop order was in the 
public interest was that there was inherent minimal disclosure in 
registration by notification, yet the District Court found that 
this was not a significant element the Executive Director's 
decision, ^j In addition, the District Court found that the 
Executive Director could merely claim that the order was in 
the public interest without any evidence or showing to that 
effect. 
In the instant case, the Division did not plead the public 
interest in the Pet i t i ons: did not produce any facts showing 
that the Order it was in the public interest; did not produce 
any statute or any determining or persuasive case law showing 
that the Order was in the public interest; and the Division 
never argued in any document or in the Pre-hearing Conference 
that the Order was in the public interest. Review of the 
Division's Br i ef shows that the Division never argued that 
there was "inherent minimal disclosure" in registration by 
notification nor that Appellants had not disclosed all material 
facts or made a misstatpm*nt of any material fact. Therefore, 
there is nothing in the record to substantiate, either in fact or 
in law, that registration by notification is inherently inferior 
to other types of registration or that there is minimal 
disclosure inherent in registration by notification. There are 
no facts, no law, and no argument to justify this conclusion. In 
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addition, the -fact that the only -fraud allegations which the 
Division brought against Appellants were denied, properly leads 
to the conclusion that the Division had no evidence that 
Appellants had not made full and -fair disclosure in the 
registration documents. Based upon this, the Division never met 
its burden of proof, nor did the Executive Director have any 
facts or arguments to sustain the public interest requirement. 
More importantly, the Executive Director's justification for 
finding that the Order was in the public interest amounts to 
a finding that the use of the provisions of Section 8 by any 
person for any offering would be disallowed: that, in effect, 
^he registration by notification provisions can never be used 
because of the "minimal disclosure" inherent in such provisions. 
This is an absurd argument which it is clearly beyond the 
authority of both the Executive Director and the District Court 
to sustain. The Legislature enacted the provision of Section 8 
for the use of persons desiring to register securities and in 
accordance with the purposes of the entire Act: these provisions 
cannot be written out of the statute by any administrative agency 
or by any court. Should this justification be permitted to 
stand, it will serve as precedent both that no person may use the 
provisions for registration by notification and that the 
Executive Director may, by mere fiat, effectively remove from the 
statutes which he administers any provision with which he does 
not personally agree despite the clear legislative intent behind 
the enactment of such provisions. 
Even the District Court held that the "minimal disclosure" 
Page 72 
•finding o-f the Executive Director had to have its basis in 
speci-fic law or statute and that the Executive Director did not 
base his public interest decision upon specific law or statute. 
The District Court went on, however, to err by finding that the 
Executive Director could make a mere unsupported allegation that 
the Order was in the public interest and that this would be 
sufficient to sustain the Order on review. As pointed out in 
many cases, an administrative agency must have facts and/or law 
to sustain the burden of proving that its action is in the public 
interest and a mere allegation of public interest is 
insufficient. Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, 
3 Utah 2d 293, 333 P.2d 1061 <1?58>, Burlinoton Trucklines 
v. U.S., 371 U.S. 156 <1?62). As pointed out by the court in 
Lake Shore, 333 P.2d at 1063, in discussing the public 
convenience and necessity requirement of the Public Service 
Comm i ss i on: 
Our understanding of the statute is that there 
should be a showing that existing services are in some 
measure inadequate, or that public need as to the 
potential of business is such that there is some . 
reasonable basis in the evidence to believe that public
 K> 
convenience and necessity justify the additional - 1 
proposed service. For the rule to be otherwise would 
ignore the provisions of the statute; and also would 
make meaningless the holding of formal hearings to make 
such determinations and render futile efforts of 
existing carriers to defend their operating rights. 
^ 
In conclusion, an essential element of the Executive 
Director's power to issue a stop order is that the Executive 
Director find that the stop order be in the public interest. The 
burden was upon the Division to both plead and show that the 
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Order would be in the public interest, neither o-f which it 
did. The Executive Director -found the issuance of the Order 
to be in the public interest without there being any basis -for 
such -finding in either -fact or law and the District Court 
sustained such -finding despite clear legislative intent to permit 
such regi strat i ons. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Based upon the law, facts, and argument as set -forth 
herein by Appellants, Appellants respectfully request: 
<1) That the Court reverse the decision of the District 
Court and vacate the Order denying the effectiveness of the 
registration statements of Appellants; and 
<2> That the Court find that the Executive Director was 
required to decide Count II of the Division's Pet i t i ons and 
that the Court find, as a matter of law, that the original 
transactions between the issuers and the Appellants were exempt 
transactions pursuant to Section 14 of the Act; and 
<3> That the Court determine what a "benefit" is within 
the meaning of Section 13<12> of the Act; and 
<4> That the Court determine that the terms of "issuer" 
and "nonissuer" are exclusive terms under the Act; and 
<5) That the Court determine what the phrase "for the 
benefit of the issuer" means for the purposes of Section 13<12) 
of the Act; and 
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<6> That the Court determine that the sale of securities 
pursuant to an exemption cannot be integrated with subsequent 
distributions of those securities pursuant to effective 
registration statement; and 
(?) That the Court determine what the Division must 
prove in order to meet its burden of proof that an order is in 
the public interest as required under Section 12 of the Act} and 
<8> That the Court provide for Appellants' costs in that 
the proceedings of both the Division and the Executive Director 
were beyond the authority delegated to them by statute; and 
(?) For such other relief as the Court deems just and 
equi table. 
DATED this -JJgL day of July, 1985. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
by Attorneys for Appellants, 
Ou^ 
Lora C. Siegler 
W* Sterling Mason, Jr. 
I hereby certify that I served four copies of Appellant's brief on 
Respondents by personally delivering them to Nick Hales, Assistant 
Attorney General this 19th day of July, 1985. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
WKUI uiuiv/ i iu o e w u u i i e s rt.cc 61-1-1 
61-1-1. Fraud unlawful. It is unlawful for any person, in connection 
with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) Employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) Engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
History: 
C. 1953, 61-1-1, enacted by L. 
1963. ch. 145 §1; L. 1983. ch. 284, § 4. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to securities; pro-
viding for a securities division to 
administer and enforce state securi-
ties laws; authorizing the division 
to set registration and examination 
fees; modifying bond requirements 
for registered broker-dealers and 
investment advisers; providing sum-
mary power to deny registration 
applications; modifying coordinated 
filing requirements; limiting the ex-
tension period on summary orders; 
providing and modifying definitions; 
providing and modifying exemp-
tions from registration; providing for 
a securities advisory board; increas-
ing interest charges for violations 
brought by private litigants; provid-
ing additional penalties for securi-
ties violations; increasing the ceiling 
on criminal fines for violation of 
securities law; and authorizing the 
division to classify specific acts as 
unlawful. 
This act amends section 16-10-
51, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by chapter 57, Laws of 
Utah 1979, section 31-6-9, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as last amend-
3 
61-1-1 Utah Uniform Securities Act 
ed by chapter 45, Laws of Utah 1963, 
section 51-5-9, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as last amended by chapter 22, 
Laws of Utah 1978, sections 61-1-1, 
61-1-2, 61-1-3, 61-1-5, 61-1-6, 61-1-8, 
61-1-10, 61-1-12, 61-1-13, 61-1-15, 
61-1-16, 61-1-17, 61-1-20, 61-1-23, 
61-1-24, 61-1-25, 61-1-26, 61-1-27, 
61-1-28, 61-1-29, and 61-1-30, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
chapter 145, Laws of Utah 1963, 
sections 61-1-4, 61-1-7, 61-1-9, 61-1-
11, 61-1-14, 61-1-19, and 61-1-22, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by chapter 218, Laws of 
Utah 1979, and section 61-1-21, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by chapter 155, Laws of 
Utah 1971; enacts sections 61-1-14.5, 
61-1-18.1, 61-1-18.2, 61-1-18.3, 61-1-
18.4, 61-1-18.5, and 61-1-21.5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953: and repeals 
and re-enacts section 61-1-18, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by chapter 191, Laws of 
Utah 1969. — Laws 1983, ch. 284. 
Comparative Legislation. 
Jurisdictions which have enact-
ed the Uniform Securities Act in-
clude: 
Ala. Code §§ 8-6-1 to 8-6-33. 
Alaska Stat. § 45.55.010 et seq. 
Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 67-1235 to 67-
1263. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 11-51-101 to 
11-51-129. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 36-470 to 
36-502. 
D.C. Code Ann. §§ 2-2601 to 
2-2618. 
Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 485-1 to 
485-25. 
Idaho Code § 30-1401 et seq. 
Ind. Code Ann. §§ 23-2-1-1 to 
23-2-1-24. 
Iowa Code §§ 502.101 to 502.614. 
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-1252 to 
17-1275. 
Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 292.310 to 
292.550, 292.991. 
Md. Corporations and Associa-
tions Code Ann. §§ 11-101 to 11-805. 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110A, 
§§101 to 417. 
Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 451.501 to 
451.818. 
Minn. Stat. §§ 80A.01 to 80A.31. 
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-71-101 to 
75-71-735. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 409.101 to 
409.418. 
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 30-10-101 
to 30-10-308. 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 8-1101 to 
8-1124. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 90.010 to 
90.210. 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 421-B:1 
to421-B:34. 
N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 49:3-47 to 
49:3-76. 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-13-1 to 
58-13-47. 
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 78A-1 to 
78A-65. 
Okla. Stat. tit. 71, §§ 101 to 502. 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 59.005 et seq. 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, §: 1-101 to 
1-704. 
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, §§ 35-1-
10 to 35-1-1590. 
S. C. Code Ann. §§ 35-1-10 to 
35-1-1590. 
Va. Code §§ 13.1-501 to 13.1-
527.3. 
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 21.20.005 to 
21.20.940. 
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61-1-8. Registration by notification. (l)The following securities may 
be registered by notification, whether or not they are also eligible for regis-
tration by co-ordination under section 61-1-9: 
(a) Any security whose issuer and any predecessors have been in 
continuous operation for at least five years if there has been no default 
during the current fiscal year or within the three preceding fiscal years in 
the payment of principal, interest, or dividends on any security of the 
issuer, or any predecessor, with a fixed maturity or a fixed interest or 
dividend provision, and the issuer and any predecessors during the past 
three fiscal years have had average net earnings, determined in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting practices, (i) which are applicable to 
all securities without a fixed maturity or a fixed interest or dividend provi-
sion outstanding at the date the registration statement is filed and equal 
to at least 5% of the amount of such outstanding securities, as measured by 
the maximum offering price or the market price on a day, selected by the 
registrant, within 30 days before the date of filing the registration statement, 
whichever is higher, or book value on a day, selected by the registrant, 
within 90 days of the date of filing the registration statement to the extent 
that there is neither a readily determinable market price nor a cash offering 
price, or (ii) which, if the issuer and any predecessors have not had any 
security of the type specified in clause (i) outstanding for three full fiscal 
years, equal to at least 5% of the amount, as measured in clause (1), of 
all securities which will be outstanding if all the securities being offered 
or proposed to be offered, whether or not they are proposed to be registered 
or offered in this state, are issued; 
(b) Any security, other than a certificate of interest or participation | 
in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in payments out of production under 
such a title or lease, registered for nonissuer distribution if any security 
of the same class has ever been registered under this chapter or a predeces- i 
sor act, or the security being registered was originally issued pursuant to 
an exemption under this chapter or a predecessor act. 
(2) A registration statement under this section shall contain the fol-
lowing information and be accompanied by the following documents in 
addition to the information specified in subsection 61-1-11(3) and the 
consent to service of process required by subsection 61-1-26(6): 
(a) A statement demonstrating eligibility for registration by notifi-
cation; 
(b) With respect to the issuer and any significant subsidiary: its name, 
address, and form of organization; the state or foreign jurisdiction and 
the date of its organization; and the general character and location of its 
business; 
(c) With respect to any person on whose behalf any part of the offering 
is to be made in a nonissuer distribution: his name and address; the 
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amount of securities of the issuer held by him as of the date of the filing 
of the registration statement; and a statement of his reasons for making 
the offering; 
(d) A description of the security being registered; 
(e) The information and documents specified in clauses (h), (i), and 
(j) of subsection 61-1-10(2); and 
(f) In the case of any registration under subsection 61-1-8(1) (b) 
which does not also satisfy the conditions of subsection 61-1-8(1) (a ) : 
a balance sheet of the issuer as of a date within four months prior to the 
filing of the registration statement; and a summary of earnings for each of 
the two fiscal years preceding the date of the balance sheet and for any 
period between the close of the last fiscal year and the date of the balance 
sheet, or for the period of the issuer's and any predecessor's existence if less 
than two years. 
(3) If no stop order is in effect and no proceeding is pending under 
section 61-1-12, a registration statement under this section automatically 
becomes effective at three o'clock mountain standard time in the afternoon 
of the second full business day after the filing of the registration statement 
or the last amendment, or at such earlier time as the division determines. 
History: 
C. 1953, 61-1-8, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 284, 
§11. 
61-1-9, Registration by co-ordination. (1) Any security for which a 
registration statement or a notification under Regulation A or any succes-
sor to Regulation A has been filed under the Securities Act of 1933 in 
connection with the same offering may be registered by co-ordination. 
(2) A registration statement under this section shall contain the fol-
lowing information and be accompanied by the following documents in 
addition to the information specified in subsection 61-1-11(3) and the 
consent to service of process required by subsection 61-1-26(6): 
(a) One copy of the disclosure statement together with all its amend-
ments filed under the Securities Act of 1933; 
(b) If the division by rule or otherwise requires, a copy of the articles 
of incorporation and bylaws or their substantial equivalents currently 
in effect, a copy of any agreements with or among underwriters, a copy of 
any indenture or other instrument governing the issuance of the security to 
be registered and a specimen or copy of the security; 
(c) If the division requests, any other information, or copies of any 
other documents, filed under the Securities Act of 1933; and 
(d) An undertaking to forward all future amendments to the disclosure 
statement promptly and in any event not later than the first business day 
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filing an amendment shall pay a registration fee as determined by rule or 
order of the division with respect to the additional securities proposed 
to be offered. 
History: 
C. 1953, 61-1-11, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1973, ch. 157, 
§1; 1979, ch. 218, § 4; 1983, ch. 284, 
§14. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1979 amendment added the 
fourth sentence to subsec. (2); sub-
stituted "registration fee" for "filing 
fee" in subsec. (10); added subsec. 
(11); and made minor changes in 
phraseology. 
Cross-References. 
False corporate reports as crime, 
76-10-707. 
61-1-12. Stop order. (1) Upon approval by the executive director and 
a majority of the securities advisory board, the executive director may 
issue a stop order denying effectiveness to, or suspending or revoking the 
effectiveness of, any securities registration statement if he finds that the 
order is in the public interest and that: 
(a) The registration statement as of its effective date or as of any 
earlier date in the case of an order denying effectiveness, or any amendment 
under subsection 61-1-11(10) as of its effective date, or any report under 
subsection 61-1-11 (9) is incomplete in any material respect or contains any 
statement which was, in the light of the circumstances under which it was 
made, false or misleading with respect to any material fact; 
(b) Any provision of this chapter or any rule, order, or condition 
lawfully imposed under this chapter has been willfully violated, in connec-
tion with the offering, by: (i) the person filing the registration statement; 
(ii) the issuer, any partner, officer, or director of the issuer, any person 
occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, or any person 
directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, but only if the 
person filing the registration statement is directly or indirectly controlled 
by or acting for the issuer; or (iii) any underwriter; 
(c) The security registered or sought to be registered is the subject of 
an administrative stop order or similar order or a permanent or temporary 
injunction of any court of competent jurisdiction entered under any other 
federal or state act applicable to the offering. The division may not institute 
a proceeding against an effective registration statement under this sub-
section more than one year from the date of the order or injunction relied on, 
and it may not enter an order under this subsection on the basis of an order 
or injunction entered under any other state act unless that order or injunc-
tion was based on facts which would currently constitute a ground for a 
stop order under this section; 
(d) The issuer's enterprise or method of business includes or would 
include activities which are illegal where performed; 
(e) The offering has worked or tended to work a fraud upon purchasers 
or would so operate; 
^ (f) The offering has been or would be made with unreasonable amounts 
of underwriters' and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation, 
or promoters' profits or participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds 
of options; 
(g) When a security is sought to be registered by notification, it is not 
eligible for such registration; 
(h) When a security is sought to be registered by co-ordination, there 
has been a failure to comply with the undertaking required by subsection 
61-1-9(2) (d); or 
(i) The applicant or registrant has failed to pay the proper filing fee. 
The division may enter a denial order under this subsection but shall vacate 
the order when the deficiency has been corrected. 
The division may not institute a stop-order proceeding against an 
effective registration statement on the basis of a fact or transaction known 
to it when the registration statement became effective unless the proceeding 
is instituted within the next 30 days. 
(2) The division may by order summarily postpone, suspend, or deny 
the effectiveness of a securities registration statement pending final deter-
mination of any proceeding under this section. Upon the entry of the order, 
the division shall promptly notify each person specified in subsection (3) 
that it has been entered and of the reasons therefor and that within 15 busi-
ness days after the receipt of a written request the matter will be set down 
for hearing. If no hearing is requested and none is ordered by the division 
or executive director, the order will remain in effect until it is modified or 
vacated by the executive director. If a hearing is requested or ordered, upon 
approval by the executive director and a majority of the securities advisory 
board, the executive director, after notice of and opportunity for hearing to 
each person specified in subsection (3), may affirm, modify, or vacate the 
order or extend it until final determination. The executive director may not 
extend any summary order for more than ten business days. 
/— (3) No stop order may be entered under any part of this section except 
the first sentence of subsection (2) without: (a) appropriate prior notice 
to the applicant or registrant, the issuer, and the person on whose behalf the 
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securities are to be or have been offered; (b) opportunity for hearing; and 
(c) written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(4) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the 
securities advisory board, the executive director may vacate or modify a 
stop order if he finds that the conditions which prompted its entry have 
changed or that it is otherwise in the public interest to do so. 
History: 
C. 1953, 61-1-12, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 284, 
§15. 
61-1-13. Definitions. As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means a person that, directly or indirectly, through one 
or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or is under common 
control with a person specified. 
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a broker-dealer who 
represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect pur-
chases or sales of securities. "Agent" does not include an individual who 
represents an issuer, who receives no commission or other remuneration, 
directly or indirectly, for effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales 
of securities, and who: (a) effects transactions in securities exempted by 
clause (a), (b), (c), (i), or (j) of subsection 61-1-14(1); (b) effects 
transactions exempted by subsection 61-1-14(2); or (c) effects transactions 
with existing partners, officers, or directors of the issuer. 
(3) "Broker-dealer" means any person engaged in the business of 
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others or for his own 
account "Broker-dealer" does not include: (a) an agent; (b) an issuer; 
(c) a bank, savings institution, or trust company; (d) a person who has 
no place of business in this state if: (i) he effects transactions in this state 
exclusively with or through (A) the issuers of the securities involved in the 
transactions, (B) other broker-dealers, or (C) banks, savings institutions, 
trust companies, insurance companies, investment companies as defined 
in the Investment Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing trust, or 
other financial institutions or institutional buyers, whether acting for them-
selves or as trustees; or (ii) during any period of 12 consecutive months 
he does not direct more than 15 offers to sell or buy into this state in any 
manner to persons other than those specified in clause (i) , whether or not 
the offeror or any of the offerees is then present in this state: (e) a general 
partner who organizes and effects transactions in securities of three or fewer 
limited partnerships, of which he is the general partner, in any period of 
12 consecutive months; (f) a person whose participation in transactions in 
securities is confined to those transactions made by or through a broker-
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dealer registered in this state; (g) a person who is a real estate broker 
licensed in this state and who effects transactions in a bond or other evidence 
of indebtedness secured by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by 
an agreement for the sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage, 
deed or trust, or agreement, together with all the bonds or other evidences of 
indebtedness secured thereby, is offered and sold as a unit; or (h) other 
persons as the division, by rule or order, may designate, consistent with the 
public interest and protection of investors, as not within the intent of 
this subsection, 
(4) "Buy" or "purchase" means every contract for purchase of, con-
tract to buy, or acquisition of a security or interest in a security for value. 
(5) "Director" means the director of the Utah Securities Division 
charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter. 
(6) "Division" means the Utah Securities Division established by sec-
tion 61-1-18. 
(7) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Business Regulation. 
(8) "Fraud," "deceit," and "defraud" are not limited to their common-
law meanings. 
(9) "Guaranteed" means guaranteed as to payment of principal or 
interest as to debt securities, or dividends as to equity securities. 
(10) "Investment adviser" means any person who, for compensation, 
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability 
of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation 
and as a part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports 
concerning securities. 
"Investment adviser" does not include: (a) a bank, savings institution, 
or trust company; (b) a lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose 
performance of these services is solely incidental to the practice of his 
profession; (c) a broker-dealer whose performance of these services is solely 
incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker-dealer and who receives 
no special compensation for them; (d) a publisher of any bona fide news-
paper, news magazine, or business or financial publication of general, 
regular, and paid circulation; (e) a person whose advice, analyses, or reports 
relate only to securities exempted by subsection 61-1-14(1) (a) ; (f) a per-
son who has no place of business in this state if (i) his only clients in this 
state are other investment advisers, broker-dealers, banks, savings institu-
tions, trust companies, insurance companies, investment companies as 
defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing 
trusts, or other financial institutions or institutional buyers, whether acting 
for themselves or as trustees, or (ii) during any period of 12 consecutive 
months he does not direct business communications into this state in any 
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manner to more than five clients other than those specified in clause (i), 
whether or not he or any of the persons to whom the communications are 
directed is then present in this state; or (g) such other persons not within 
the intent of this paragraph as the division may by rule or order designate. 
(11) (a) "Issuer" means any person who issues or proposes to issue any 
security, or has outstanding a security that it has issued. y 
(b) With respect to a preorganization certificate or subscription, 
"issuer" means the promoter or the promoters of the person to be organized. 
(c) With respect to (i) interests in trusts, including but not limited to 
collateral trust certificates, voting trust certificates and certificates of deposit 
for securities, or (ii) shares in an investment company without a board of 
directors, "issuer" means the person or persons performing the acts and 
assuming duties of a depositor or manager under the provisions of the trust 
or other agreement or instrument under which the security is issued. 
(d) With respect to an equipment trust certificate, a conditional sales 
contract, or similar securities serving the same purpose, "issuer" means the 
person by whom the equipment or property is to be used. 
(e) With respect to interests in partnerships, general or limited, 
"issuer" means the partnership itself and not the general partner or partners. 
(f) With respect to certificates of interest or participation in oil, gas, 
or mining titles or leases or in payment out of production under the titles or 
leases, "issuer" means the owner of the title or lease or right of production, 
whether whole or fractional, who creates fractional interests therein for the 
purpose of sale. —^ 
(12) "Nonissuer" means not directly or indirectly for the benefit of 
the issuer. —y 
(13) "Person" means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an 
association, a joint-stock company, a joint venture, a trust where the inter-
ests of the beneficiaries are evidenced by a security, an unincorporated 
organization, a government, or a political subdivision of a government. 
(14) "Promoter" means any person who, acting alone or in concert 
with one or more persons, takes initiative in founding or organizing the 
business or enterprise of a person. 
(15) (a) "Sale" or "sell" includes every contract for sale of, contract 
to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value. 
(b) "Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every attempt or offer to dis-
pose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security 
for value. 
(c) The following are examples of the definitions in subsections (a) 
and (b) : 
(i) Any security given or delivered with or as a bonus on account of 
ahy purchase of a security or any other thing, is part of the subject of the 
purchase, and has been offered and sold for value. 
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(ii) A purported gift of assessable stock is an offer or sale as is each 
assessment levied on the stock. 
(iii) An offer or sale of a security that is convertible into, or entitles its 
holder to acquire or subscribe to another security of the same or another 
issuer is an offer or sale of that security, and also an offer of the other 
security, whether the right to convert or acquire is exercisable immediately 
or in the future. 
(iv) Any conversion or exchange of one security for another shall 
constitute an offer or sale of the security received in a conversion or 
exchange, and the offer to buy or the purchase of the security converted 
or exchanged. 
(v) Securities distributed as a dividend wherein the person receiving 
the dividend surrenders the right, or the alternative right, to receive a cash 
or property dividend is an offer or sale. 
(vi) A dividend of a security of another issuer is an offer or sale. 
(vii) The issuance of a security under a merger, consolidation, reorgani-
zation, reclassification, or acquistion of assets shall constitute the offer 
or sale of the security issued as well as the offer to buy or the purchase of 
any security surrendered in connection therewith, unless the sole purpose 
of the transaction is to change the issuer's domicile. 
(d) The terms defined in subsections (a) and (b) do not include: 
(i) A good faith gift; 
(ii) A transfer by death; 
(iii) A transfer by termination of a trust or of a beneficial interest in 
a trust; 
(iv) A security dividend not within clauses (c), (v) or (vi); 
(v) A securities split or reverse split; or 
(vi) Any act incident to a judicially approved reorganization in which 
a security is issued in exchange for one or more outstanding securities, 
claims, or property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash. 
(16) "Securities Act of 1933," "Securities Exchange Act of 1934," 
"Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935," and "Investment Company 
Act of 1940" mean the federal statutes of those names as amended before 
or after the effective date of this chapter. 
(17) "Security" means any note; stock; treasury stock; bond; deben-
ture; evidence of indebtedness; certificate of interest or participation in any 
profit-sharing agreement; collateral-trust certificate; preorganization certi-
ficate or subscription; transferable share; investment contract; burial certi-
ficate or burial contract; voting-trust certificate; certificate of deposit for a 
security; certificate of interest of participation in an oil, gas, or mining title 
or lease or in payments out of production under such a title or lease; or, 
in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," 
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to 
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or purchase, any of the foregoing. "Security" does not include any insur-
ance or endowment policy or annuity contract under which an insurance 
company promises to pay money in a lump sum or periodically for life or 
some other specified period. 
(18) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
History: 
C. 1953, 61-1-13, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 284, 
§16. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The following federal acts, de-
fined in subsec. (16) and cited 
throughout this chapter, are com-
piled in the United States Code as 
shown: Securities Act of 1933 (15 
U.S.C. § 77a et seq.), Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78a 
et seq.), Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935 (15 U.S.C. 
§ 79a et seq.), and Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80a-l 
et seq.). 
Law Reviews. 
Securities Law and the Fran-
chise Agreement, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 
311. 
61-1-14. Exemptions. (1) The following securities are exempted from 
sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15: 
(a) Any security, including a revenue obligation, issued or guaranteed 
by the United States, any state, any political subdivision of a state, or any 
agency or corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of the fore-
going, or any certificate of deposit for any of the foregoing; 
(b) Any security issued or guaranteed by Canada, any Canadian 
province, any political subdivision of any such province, any agency or 
corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, or any 
other foreign government with which the United States currently maintains 
diplomatic relations, if the security is recognized as a valid obligation by 
the issuer or guarantor; 
(c) Any security issued by and representing an interest in or a debt of, 
or guaranteed by, any bank organized under the laws of the United States, 
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have violated section 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any offer or sale effected 
after the entry of an order under this subsection if he sustains the burden 
of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could 
not have known, of the order. 
History: 
C. 1953, 61-1-14, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1979, ch. 218, 
§ 5; 1983, ch. 284, § 17. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1979 amendment inserted 
"the National Association of Securi-
ties Automated Quotation System" 
near the beginning of subd. (1) (g); 
added "but the exemption * * * by 
subsection 61-1-11 (11)" to subd. 
(1) (g); deleted "if the commission 
is notified thirty days before the in-
ception of the plan, or with respect 
to plans which are in effect on the 
effective date of this act, within sixty 
days thereafter (or within thirty 
days before they are reopened if 
they are closed on the effective date 
of this act)" from the end of subd. 
(1) (j); substituted "Any nonissuer 
transaction in" at the beginning of 
subd. (2) (b) for "Any nonissuer 
distribution of"; added subds. (2) 
(1) to (2) (o); and made minor 
changes in phraseology and style. 
61-1-14.5. Burden of proving exemption. In any proceeding under 
this chapter, civil, criminal, administrative, or judicial, the burden of prov-
ing an exemption under section 61-1-14 or an exception from a definition 
under section 61-1-13 is upon the person claiming the exemption or excep-
tion. 
History: 
C. 1953,61-1-14.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 284, § 18. 
61-1-15. Filing of sales literature. The division may by rule or order 
require the filing of any prospectus, pamphlet, circular, form letter, adver-
tisement, or other sales literature or advertising communication addressed 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Securities Division 
Utah Department of Business Regulation 
Fifth Floor 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 530-6612 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE : PETITION 
REGISTRATION STATEMENT OF : 
TECHNOMEDICAL LABS, INC. 
: CASE NO. 
The Securities Division of the Department of Business 
Regulation of the State of Utah (the Division), by and through its 
director, John B. Hiatt, upon knowledge and belief, hereby complains 
and alleges as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
These causes of action were investigated by the Division upon 
complaints that TECHNOMEDICAL LABS, INC. (LABS) has engaged in 
acts and practices which constitute violations of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1, et seq. (the Act). 
PARTIES 
1. The Division m a Division of the Department of Business 
Regulation of the State of Utah, established by virtue of § 61-1-18 of 
the Act. 
2. LABS is a Utah corporation with its principal place of 
business located at 1981 East Murray Holladay Road, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84117. 
JURISDICTION 
3. LABS made application with the Division on February 15, 
1984, to register common stock by notification for distribution in the 
State of Utah. 
4. Common stock of TECHNOMEDICAL PROPERTIES, INC, 
(PROPERTIES) constitutes "securities" under the provisions of 
§ 61-1-13(17) of the Act. 
COUNT I 
5o Section 61-1 -12(1 )(g) of the Act provides that the 
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Business Regulation, with 
the majority of the Securities Advisory Board, may issue a stop order 
denying the effectiveness of any securities registration statement if it is 
found that the order is in the public interest and that when a security 
is sought to be registered by notification, it is not eligible for such 
registration. 
6. Section 61-1-8(1 )(b) of the Act provides for registration 
by notification for any security registered for nonissuer distribution if 
the security being registered was originally issued pursuant to an 
exemption under the Act. 
7. Section 61-1-13(12) defines nonissuer to mean not directly 
or indirectly for the benefit of the issuer. 
8* The distribution of said common stock will be performed 
directly or indirectly for the benefit of PROPERTIES, who is an issuer 
under the provisions of § 61-1-13(11)(a) and (13) of the Act. 
9. The distribution for which LABS seeks registration 
therefore does not constitute a nonissuer distribution, precluding said 
common stock from being eligible for registration, thereby constituting 
grounds for a stop order denying effectiveness to the securities 
COUNT 11 
10. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 above as if specifically 
set out herein. 
11. LABS in its application, alleges that the common stock 
was originally issued pursuant to an exemption from registration 
contained in §§ 61-1-14(2)(a) and (n) of the Act. 
12. Section 61-1-14*5 of the Act provides that in any 
administrative proceeding under the Act, the burden of proving an 
exemption under § 61-1-14 of the Act is upon the person claiming the 
exemption. 
13. The common stock was originally issued through 
transactions which do not constitute exemptions under §§ 61-1-14(2)(a) 
and (n) of the Act, precluding said common stock from being eligible 
for registration, thereby constituting grounds for a stop order denying 
effectiveness to the securities registration statement under 
§ 61-1-12(1)(b) of the Act. 
COUNT III 
14. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 13 above as if fully set 
out herein. 
15. Section 61-1-12(1 )(e) of the Act provides that the 
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Business Regulations, 
with the majority of the Securities Advisory Board, may issue a stop 
order denying the effectiveness of any securities registration statement 
if it is found that the order is in the public interest and that the 
offering has worked or has tended to work a fraud upon purchasers or 
would so operate. 
16. PROPERTIES is undercapitalized for its stated business 
purpose of investing in energy and mineral properties, both real and 
personal * 
17. PROPERTIES has stated no plans for either generating 
revenue or increasing its capitalization, 
18. PROPERTIES only possible means of generating revenue 
or increasing capitalization would be to merge with an on-going 
enterprise. 
19. Such a merger would occur for the sole purpose of 
avoiding the registration requirements of the Act, therefore the 
distribution has tended to work a fraud upon purchasers or would so 
operate, and thereby constitutes grounds for a stop order denying the 
effectiveness to the securities registration statement under the 
provisions of § 61-1-12(1 )(e) of the Act. 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1 . That LABS be adjudged and decreed to have engaged in 
the acts alleged herein. 
2. That by engaging in the above acts, LABS be adjudged 
and decreed to have violated the provisions of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act indicated above, 
3. *hat a stop order be issued denying effectiveness to the 
securities registration statement of LABS. 
4. That said stop order be determined to be in the public 
interest o 
DATED this / / day of February, 1984. 
.. HI ATT 
•ities Division 
Department of Business Reg. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the / 7 day of February, 1984, personally appeared 
before me JOHN B. HI ATT, the signer of the above instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same on behalf of the 
State of Utah. 
NOTARY PUBLIC "™y'n 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing *\
 mxh<& jrfc/. 
Securities Division 
Utah Department of Business Regulation 
Fifth Floor 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 530-6612 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE : PETITION 
REGISTRATION STATEMENT OF : 
TPI , INC. : 
: CASE NO. 
The Securities Division of the Department of Business 
Regulation of the State of Utah (the Division), by and through its 
director, John B. Hiatt, upon knowledge and belief, hereby complains 
and alleges as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
These causes of action were investigated by the Division upon 
complaints that TPI , INC. (TPI) has engaged in acts and practices 
which constitute violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1, et seq. (the Act). 
PARTIES 
1. The Division «tf a Division of the Department of Business 
Regulation of the State of Utah, established by virtue of § 61-1-18 of 
the Act. 
2. TPI is a Utah corporation with its principal place of 
business located at 1981 East Murray Holladay Road, Suite #240, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84117. 
JURISDICTION 
3. TPI made application wj t n the Division on February 15, 
1984, to register common stock by notification for distribution in the 
State of Utah. 
4. Common stock of TPI L A N D , INC. (LAND) constitutes 
"securities" under the provisions of § 61-1-13(17) of the Act. 
COUN-M 
5. Section 61-1-12(1)(g) Of the Act provides that the 
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Business Regulation, with 
the majority of the Securities Advisory Board, may issue a stop order 
denying the effectiveness of any securities registration statement if it is 
found that the order is in the public interest and that when a security 
is sought to be registered by notification, it is not eligible for such 
registration. 
6. Section 61-1-8(1 ) (b) of the Act provides for registration 
by notification for any security registered for nonissuer distribution if 
the security being registered was origjna||y jSSUed pursuant to an 
exemption under the Act. 
7. Section 61-1-13(12) defines nonissuer to mean not directly 
or indirectly for the benefit of the i s s u e r . 
8. The distribution of saiq common stock will be performed 
di'rectry or fndTrectfy for the 6enert't
 D f LAND, who is an fssuer under 
the provisions of § 61-1-13(11)(a) any (13)
 0 f the Act. 
9. The distribution for whjch TPI seeks registration 
therefore does not constitute a noniss,uer distribution, precluding said 
common stock from being eligible for registration, thereby constituting 
grounds for a stop order denying effectiveness to the securities 
registration statement under § 61-1-12(1 ) (b) of the Act. 
COtfNTrH 
10. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 above as if specifically 
set out herein, 
11. TPI , in its application, alleges that the common stock 
was originally issued pursuant to an exemption from registration 
contained in §§ 61-1-14(2)(a) and (n) of the Act. 
12. Section 61-1-14.5 of the Act provides that in any 
administrative proceeding under the Act, the burden of proving an 
exemption under § 61-1-14 of the Act is upon the person claiming the 
exemption. 
13. The common stock was originally issued through 
transactions which do not constitute exemptions under §§ 61-1-14(2)(a) 
and (n) of the Act, precluding said common stock from being eligible 
for registration, thereby constituting grounds for a stop order denying 
effectiveness to the securities registration statement under 
§ 61-1-12(1)(b) of the Act. 
COUNT III 
14. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 13 above as if fully set 
out herein. 
15. Section 61-1-12(1 )(e) of the Act provides that the 
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Business Regulations, 
with the majority of the Securities Advisory Board, may issue a stop 
order denying the effectiveness of any securities registration statement 
if it is found that the order is in the public interest and that the 
offering has worked or has tended to work a fraud upon purchasers or 
would so operate. 
16. LAND is undercapitalized for its stated business purpose 
of investing in energy and mineral properties, both real and personal, 
17. LAND has stated no plans for either generating revenue 
or increasing its capitalization. 
18. LAND'S only possible means of generating revenue or 
increasing capitalization would be to merge \yith an on-going enterprise. 
19. Such a merger would occur for the sole purpose of 
avoiding the registration requirements of the Act, therefore the 
distribution has tended to work a fraud upon purchasers or would so 
operate, and thereby constitutes grounds for a stop order denying the 
effectiveness to the securities registration statement under the 
provisions of § 61-1-12(1 )(e) of the Act. 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1. That TPI be adjudged and decreed to have engaged in 
the acts alleged herein. 
2. That by engaging in the above acts, TPI be adjudged and 
decreed to have violated the provisions of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act indicated above. 
3. tha t a stop order be issued denying effectiveness to the 
securities registration statement of TPI . 
4. That said stop order be determined to be in the public 
interest. 
DATED this / 7 day of February, 1984. 
VOHN B. HI ATT 
Securities Division 
Utah Department of Business Reg. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the ft*^ day of February, 1984, personally appeared 
before me JOHN B. HI ATT, the signer of the above instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same on behalf of the 
State of Utah-. 
NOTARY PUBLIC / 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing at: *&?/<£<rf#4e £#*>~^ 
EXHIBIT ffCff 
Lora C. Siegler 
W. Sterling Mason, Jr. 
Attorneys at Law 
2d Floor 
143 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
<801) 363-6247 
<801) 484-4567 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
REGISTRATION STATEMENTS 
OF TPI, INC., LPI CORP. 
FUTECH, INC., MOLYTECH, INC. 
DRAKE EXPLORATI ON, INC., 
TECHNOMEDICAL LABS, INC., AND 
KEALEY ENTERPRISES, INC. 
REQUEST OF RESPONDENTS 
FOR STIPULATIONS AS TO 
FACTS 
CASE NOS. SD-84-01, 02, 
03, 04, 05, 
06 AND 07 
Respondents, by and through counsel, hereby agree to stipulate 
and hereby request that Petitioner stipulate, -for the purposes o-f the 
stated actions only, as to the truth o-f the following facts and that, 
for the purposes of the stated actions only, such facts are not in 
dispute and will not be placed in dispute for the purposes of the 
stated actions: 
1. <a> MAGNETRONICS, INC. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of LPI CORP. 
<b> KEALEY PROPERTIES, INC. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of KEALEY 
ENTERPRISES, INC. 
<c> FUTECH PROPERTIES, INC. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
FUTECH, INC. 
<d> MOLYTECH PROPERTIES, INC. is a whol1y-owned subsidiary of 
MOLYTECH, INC. 
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STIPULATIONS 
<e> CHECKMATE TECHNOLOGY, INC. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
DRAKE EXPLORATION, INC. 
<f> TPI LAND, INC. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of TPI , INC. 
<g> TECHNOMEDICAL PROPERTIES, INC. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
TECHNOMEDICAL LABS, INC. 
2. All 14 of the above-named corporations were incorporated in Utah. 
3. All 14 of the above-named corporations are in good standing with 
the Utah Office of the Lieutenant Governor. 
. 4. Each of the 14 above-named corporations is a separate legal 
Mr 
ent i ty. 
5. Each of the 14 above-named corporations is subject to the rights, 
)4- obligations and restrictions contained in the Utah Business 
Corporat ions Act, Title 16, Ch. 10, U.C.A. 
J 6. Each of the 7 parent corporations is a publicly-held corporation. 
\y?. Each of the 7 subsidiary corporations is a closely-held 
corporat i on. 
> 8. None of the 7 subsidiary corporations has a present intent to 
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merge. 
9. Each of the 7 parent corporations acquired the shares of their 
respective subsidiary corporations in a transaction which; 
(a) Involved only the two corporate parties} 
(b) Involved no offer or sale of securities to the public; 
(c) Involved no advertising or general solicitation; 
(d) Constituted the only issuance of stock of the subsidiary 
since the inception of the subsidiary; and 
<e> Allowed access of the parent corporation to all of the 
books, records and other information with respect to the subsidiary 
corporat i on. 
10. None of the parent corporations will receive any cash 
consideration, remuneration, or commissions, directly or indirectly, 
from the proposed distribution of the common stock of the subsidiary 
corporations to the shareholders of the parent corporations in partial 
liquidating dividends. 
11. None of the subsidiary corporations will receive any cash 
consideration, remuneration, or commissions, directly or indirectly, 
from the proposed distribution of the common stock of the subsidiary 
corporations to the shareholders of the parent corporations in partial 
liquidating dividends. 
-Page 3-
STIPULATIONS 
12. <a> The stated business purpose of MAGNETRONICS, INC. is 
investing in investments of all forms and nature. 
<b> The stated business purpose of TPI LAND, INC. is investing in 
investments of all forms and nature. 
<c) The stated business purpose of KEALEY PROPERTIES, INC. is 
investing in investments of all forms and nature. 
<d) The stated business purpose of FUTECH PROPERTIES, INC. is 
investing in investments of all forms and nature. 
( <e> The stated business purpose of MOLYTECH PROPERTIES, INC. is 
) investing in investments of all forms and nature. 
<f> The stated business purpose of CHECKMATE TECHNOLOGY, INC. is 
dealing with computer hardware and software, and other technology. 
<g> The stated business purpose of TECHNOMEDICAL PROPERTIES, INC. 
is investing in investments of all forms and nature. 
j 13. After the proposed distributions in partial liquidating dividends 
J by the parent corporations, the parent corporations may or may not own 
or control the subsidiary corporations. 
14. The subsicM-acy corptfl^aXTons are not undercapitalized for their 
IS. The subsidiary corporations could raise additional capital, 
acquire assets or generate revenue by various means including but not 
^/limited to: acquiring assets from any individual, corporation, 
/ association or other person in exchange for shares of stock of the 
subsidiary corporation; acquiring stock or partnership units in other 
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STIPULATIONS 
business entities; issuing and selling shares of stock in a 
transaction exempt from registration pursuant to Section 14 of the 
Act; issuing and selling shares of stock pursuant to a registration 
statement filed pursuant to Section 9 of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act (the "Act") and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission; 
issuing and selling shares of stock pursuant to a registration 
statement filed pursuant to Section 8 or 10 of the Act; merging with, 
consolidating with or acquiring the assets of any public or private 
corporat i on. 
U 6 . None of the subsidiaries have any present intent to offer or sell 
the securities of the subsidiary in violation of the Act, the federal 
securities laws, or the securities laws of any state. 
17. None of the subsidiaries have any present intent to consummate 
' any transaction which would constitute a violation of any statute or 
rule, including the Act, the rules and regulations thereunder, and all 
other statutes of the State of Utaha 
M 8 » Each of the registration statements and prospectuses filed by the 
parent corporations states the correct business purpose of the 
respective subsidiary corporation. 
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/ 
19. Each of the registration statements and prospectuses filed by the 
parent corporations states that the respective subsidiary corporation 
has limited capitalization. 
v 20. Each of the registration statements and prospectuses filed by the j parent corporations states that the subsidiary corporation is a 
development stage company. 
21. Each of the registration statements and prospectuses filed by the 
\ /parent corporations states that the subsidiary corporation has 
J additional authorized but unissued shares uihich it may issue for cash, 
property or services. 
2 2 . A s t a t u t o r y merger consJJ-ttrfeT the o f f e r and sa le of the 
i / s e c u r i t i e s of tjxe-^^surv i v i n g ^ x o c j i p r a t i on pursuant to Sect ion 
13<15><c>0^rT> of the A c t . 
t1 / 23. A statutory merger- i nv^J a Utah corporation is an exempt 
transaction purs± :o Section 14XZ)<p> of the Act 
24. The proposed distributions in partial liquidation of the shares 
A/ of the subsidiary corporations to the shareholders of the respective 
v; parent corporations is proposed to be pursuant to a vote of the 
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shareholders of the parent corporations. 
25. The proposed distributions in partial liqjj>d*tion of the shares 
of the subsi di ary c^rjwirat i ons to thf^sffarehol ders of the respective 
parent corporations are within^the scope of Subparagraphs <i> and <ii) 
of Section 14<2><p> of the Act and^<ould have filed the proxy 
statements which are included in the registration statements with the 
Secur i t i es^-tfi v i si on in application for that exemption from 
regi strat i on. 
26. Pursuant to Section L4<2)<p)<v> the Secur i t i es j)j vi si on has ten 
days from the date of filing of^^^^c+r^proxy materials, and of the 
information required to be filed pursuant to any rules or regulations 
of the Securities Division, in which to deny or revoke the use of such 
exempt i QT\»^^ 
27. The Securities Division has no evidence that any of the 
registration statements contained, either at the time of filing or at 
the time that such registration would have been effective by the terms 
f 
of Section 8 of the Act, a misstatement of any material fact or 
\omitted to state a material fact necessary to make the statements 
made,/'in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
mi sieadi ng. 
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29. In the past year, the Securities Division has approved the 
effectiveness of registration by qualification, for one or more 
registrants, where the issuer has had all of the following 
character i st i cs: 
(a) The issuer was the registrant; 
(b) The issuer was initially capitalized by $2000 or less; 
(c) The registration application requested registration to 
sell securities with an aggregate offering price of *10,000 or less; 
<d> The registration statement disclosed that the issuer had 
no specific items proposed for which the proceeds of the offering 
would be used; 
<e) The registration statement disclosed that the issuer had 
no operating history; 
(f) The registration statement disclosed that the issuer would 
have, after the offering, authorized but unissued shares which could 
be used to acquire assets; 
(g) The registration statement disclosed that the issuer had 
limited capitalization or was undercapitaliled; and 
<h) The registration statement disclosed that the issuer could 
merge with or acquire another business entity. 
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WHEREFORE, Respondents, by and through counsel, hereby agree to 
stipulate, for the purposes of the stated actions only, as to the 
truth of the above facts as stated herein and as amended herein by 
hand and that, for the purposes of the stated actions only, such facts 
are not in dispute and will not be placed in dispute for the purposes 
of the stated actions. 
DATED this _ day of March, 1984. 
£>!« 
LORA C. SIEGLER 
W. STERLING MASON, JR. 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS 
143 East 900 South 
Second Floor 
Salt Lake Ci ty, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-6247 
<801) 484-4567 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner, by and through counsel, hereby agrees to 
stipulate, for the purposes of the stated actions only, as to the 
truth of the above facts as stated herein and as amended herein by 
hand and that, for the purposes of the stated actions only, such facts 
are not in dispute and will not be placed in dispute for the purposes 
of the stated actions. 
/^ 
DATED this „^r„ day of March, 1984. 
JOHN C. BALDWIN 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FOR THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
Room 130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 533-531? 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
b i^ V. * -* • • >'- • 
BEFORK THE SECURITIES DIVISION [-:' 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matters of the : 
Registration Statements of : PRE-HEARING ORDER 
TPI, Inc., LPI Corp., FUTECH, : 
Inc., MOLYTECH, Inc., DRAKE : Case Numbers SD-84-01, 
EXPLORATION AND TECHNOMEDICAL : SD-84-02, SD-84-03, SD-84-04, 
LABS, Inc., and KEALEY : SD-84-05, SD-84-06, SD-84-07 
ENTERPRISES, Inc. : 
Appearances: 
John Baldwin for the Securities Division 
W. Sterling Mason, Jr. and Lora Siegler for the Applicants 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
Pursuant to notice duly served, this matter came on for Pre-Hearing 
on March 5, 1984, at the hour of 1:30 p.m., before Kent Walgren, 
Administrative Law Judge for the Utah Department of Business Regulation. 
At the Pre-Hearing Conference, motions and arguments were made, a 
stipulation was reached as to all relevant facts, and rulings were made 
as follows: 
1. Applicants filed their "Request of Respondents for Stipulations 
as to Facts/* Paragraph 29(g) was amended to strike the words "or was 
undercapitalized". The parties agreed that the facts recited in the 
Request for Stipulation are true (for the purposes of this hearing) with 
the exception of paragraphs 14, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27 and 28. 
2. The parties agreed that in view of the factual stipulation 
referred to above: (a) the matters could be consolidated for hearing; 
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(b) there is no need to convene a hearing to elicit additional factual 
evidence; and (c) the matters can be argued on the law by written 
memoranda. 
3. The Division moved to amend paragraphs 9 and 13 of its Petitions 
to accurately state subsection (g) of Section 12(1) of the Securities 
Act, rather than subsection (b). The motion was granted. The Division 
also moved to amend its Petitions to: (1) strike "only possible" in 
paragraph 18 and insert "most likely"; and (2) add Count IV, in which the 
Division would allege failure to state material facts (which the parties 
agreed were not in existence at the time the Applications were filed), 
which had a tendency to work a fraud under subsection 1(e) of Section 
12. The motion was denied. 
4. Based upon the Division's representation that the only "benefit" 
contemplated in Count I was the benefit to the issuer of the shares 
becoming public, Applicants withdrew their motion to dismiss on that 
count; likewise, upon the Division's representation that Count II was 
being pursued only on an "integration theory," Applicants withdrew their 
motion to dismiss on that count. 
5. The parties agrued Applicantsr motion to dismiss as to Count III, 
agreeing that the Administrative Law Judge had no evidence showing that 
undercapitalized corporations do, in fact, have a tendency to merge with 
"on-going enterprises." The parties further agreed that they know of no 
statute, rule or case law which suggests that merging to avoid 
registration under the Act constitutes a tendency to work a fraud. The 
Administrative Law Judge held that the allegation in Count III was too 
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speculative and the motion to dismiss as to this count was granted. 
6. All relevant facts having been stipulated to, the parties agreed 
to submit memoranda on the law to the Administrative Law Judge on or 
before March 12, 1984. The Administrative Law Judge indicated that, 
absent extraordinary circumstances, he would submit his recommended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order to the Executive Director 
by March 19, 1984, and recommend to the Executive Director that a good 
faith attempt be made to confer with the Securities Advisory Board and 
issue a final order on or before March 26, 1984. Based upon this 
timetable, the Applicants withdrew their motion for an expedited hearing 
pursuant to Section 12(2) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 1984 
<$jilflll.Lyl<~^ 
KENT WALGREWi Administrative Law Judge 
EXHIBIT "E" 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matters of the Registration 
Statements of DRAKE EXPLORATION, 
Inc., FUTECK, Inc., MOLYTECH, Inc., 
TPI, Inc., KEALET ENTPERPRISES, 
Inc., TECHNOMEDICAL LABS, Inc., and 
LPI, Inc. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case Nos. SD-84-01, SD-84-02, 
SD-84-03, SD-84-04, SD-84-05, 
SD-84-06 and SD-84-07 
Appearances: 
John Baldwin for the Securities Division 
Lora Siegler and W. Sterling Mason, Jr. for the Applicants 
BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: 
Pursuant to notice duly served, these matters came on for Pre-Hearing 
on March 5, 1984, before Kent Walgren, Administrative Law Judge for the 
Utah Department of Business Regulation. Dennis G. Ritz, Executive 
Director of the Department of Business Regulation delegated the 
Administrative Law Judge to hear the matter and make recommended 
Findings, Conclusions and Order. A Pre-Hearing Order was issued on March 
6, 1984, in which certain stipuations as to facts were set-forth and 
certain rulings entered. Having stipulated that there was no necessity 
to convene a hearing to elicit additional factual evidence, the parties 
were ordered to submit, and did submit, memoranda on the law prior to 
March 13, 1984. The Administrative Law Judge entered recommended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order which are attached hereto 
and made a part hereof by reference. The- Executive Director of the 
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Department of Business Regulation, with the concurrence of all of the 
members of the Securities Advisory Board, having been fully advisee in 
the premises, now mak.es and enters the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order based thereon: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about February 15, 1984, the Securities Division 
("Division") received applications for registration from several 
corporations. Although each of the applications is independent of the 
other, they all seek to take advantage of the same registration 
provisions under the Act, were all filed at the same time, in some 
instances share common officers and directors, and pursuant to the 
stipulation of the attorneys of record on all such applications and in 
these proceedings, are being consolidated in this matter. 
/ In each instance, the Applicant is a recently organized Utah 
/ corporation which soon after its organization undertook a public offering 
/ within the state of Utah which was registered with the Division, but 
which was undertaken in reliance upon the so-called "intrastate" 
exemption provided in Section 3(a)(11) promulgated under the Securities 
Act of 1933 so that no federal filing was made. Immediately following 
the completion of the Applicant's initial public offering, each Applicant 
organized a new corporation and paid to that corporation from $1,000 to 
$2,750 in exchange for from 750,000 to 2,750,000 shares in the ne*' 
corporation. As a result of this transaction, each Applicant became the 
parent of a wholly-owned subsidiary, the sole assets of which consisted 
of the cash paid by the parent for the cash in the subsidiary. For the 
purposes of clarifying the relationship between the parties, the 
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Appiicant is sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "Parent", and the 
subsidiary is sometimes referred to as the "Subsidiary." 
Immediately after the organization of the Subsidiaries and the 
issuance of their stock, to the Parents, the Parents filed the 
applications for registration by notification which are the subject of 
these proceedings, seeking shareholder approval of the partial 
liquidating dividend of the stock of the Subsidiary held by the 
respective Parent to the shareholders of the Parent, consisting of the 
promoters of each of the Parents who received stock prior to the Parent's 
public offering as well as these persons holding stock sold in the public 
offering. Set forth below is specific information regarding these 
factors for each of the applicants. 
(a) Applicant/Parent: Drake Exploration, Inc.; Date of 
Incorporation: August 13, 1982. 
Subsidiary: Checkmate Technology, Inc.; Date of 
Incorporation: August 26, 1983; Total Offering: 2,250,000 shares; 
Total Offering Amount: $2,250; Proposed Date of Distribution: February 
22, 1984. 
(b) Applicant/Parent: Futech, Inc.; Date of Incorporation: April 
25, 1983; 
Subsidiary: Futech Properties, Inc.; Date of Incorporation: 
February 9, 1984; Total Offering: 1,000,000 shares; Total Offering 
Amount: $1,000; Proposed Date of Distribution: February 21, 1984, 
(c) Applicant/Parent: Kolytech, Inc.; Date of Incorporation: 
April 25, 1983; 
Subs idsary: Kolytech Properties, Inc.; Date cf Incorporation: 
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February 9, 1984; Total Offering: 1,000,000 shares; Total Offering 
Amount: $1,000; Proposed Date of Distribution: February 21, 1984. 
(4) Applicant/Parent: TPI, Inc.; Date of Incorporation: April 26, 
1983; 
Subsidiary: TPI Land, Inc.; Date of Incorporation: February 
9, 1984; Total Offering: 750,000 shares; Total Offering Amount: 
$1,000; Proposed Date of Distribution: February 21, 1984. 
(5) Applicant/Parent: Kealey Enterprises, Inc.; Date of 
Incorporation: April 25, 1983; 
Subsidi ary: Kealey Properties, Inc.; Date of Incorporation: 
February 9, 1984; Total Offering: 1,000,000 shares; Total Offering 
Amount: $1,000; Proposed Date of Distribution: February 21, 1984. 
(6) Applicant/Parent: Iechnomedical Labs, Inc.; Date of 
Incorporation: April 26, 1983; 
Subsidiary: Technomedical Properties, Inc.; Date of 
Incorporation: February 9, 1984; Total Offering: 750,000 shares; 
Total Offering Amount: $1,000; Proposed Date of Distribution: February 
21, 1984. 
(7) Applicant/Parent: LPI Corp.; Date of Incorporation: February 
9, 1983; 
Subsidiary: Kagnetronics, Inc.; Date of Incorporation: 
February 2, 1984; Total Offering: 2,750,000 shares; Total Offering 
Amount: $2,750; Proposed Date of Distribution: March 1, 1984. 
2. With respect to each application: 
(a) The Subsidiary is wholly-owned by the Parent; 
(b) The Subsidary has no operating history or business experience; 
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(c) The consideration received from the Parent is the Subsidiary's 
sole asset; 
(d) The Parent has not paid, declared or distributed dividends on 
its common stock, in the past and no future dividends are contemplated at 
the present time; 
(e) Each Parent and .Subsidiary is a Utah Corporation; 
(f) Each Parent is a publicly-held corporation; 
(g) Each Subsidiary is a closely-held corporation; 
(h) The stated business purpose of all Subsidiaries except Checkmate 
Technology, Inc. is "investing in investments of all forms and nature." 
The stated business purpose of Checkmate Technology, Inc. is "dealing 
with computer hardware and software, anc other technology." 
(i) The Parent proposes to distribute the outstanding shares of the 
Subsidiary as a partial liquidating dividend to Parent's shareholders of 
record; 
(j) After the proposed distributions in partial liquidating 
dividends by the Parent, the Parent may or may not own or control the 
Subsidiary corporation; 
(k) Neither the Parent nor the Subsidiary will receive any cash 
consideration, remuneration, or commissions, directly or indirectly, from 
the proposed distribution of the common stock, of the Subsidiary to the 
shareholders of the Parent; 
(1) The purpose of creating Subsidiary, according to Parent, was to 
have a Subsidiary to pursue a narrower area of investments and 
acquisitions than Parent. 
3. Before three o'clock on February 17, 1984 (within the time 
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requirements set forth in U.C.A. Section 61-1-8), the Division issued 
Petitions and Orders to Show Cause in each of the above-mentioned cases, 
ordering the Applicants/Respondents to show cause why a stop order should 
not issue denying the effectiveness of each registration and setting a 
time and date for a Pre-Hearing Conference. At the Pre-Hearing 
Conference, Count III of the Petition was dismissed and the parties 
agreed that the seven applications could be consolidated for purposes of 
this hearing. We now have before us Counts I and II of the Division's 
Petitions. 
4. Applicants propose to register their securities pursuant to 
U.C.A. Section 61-1-8(1) (b), which permits registration by notification 
of: Any sectrity...registered for nonissuer distribution if...the 
security being registered was originally issued pursuant to an 
exemption.... Tne Division alleges in its Petitions that: (a) the 
instant cases are not nonissuer distributions; and (b) the original 
issues were not pursuant to valid exemptions. We consider first whether 
the instant applications constitute nonissuer distributions. 
5. The Utah Uniform Securities Act ("Act") defines "Issuer" as "any 
person who issues or proposes to issue any security...." (Section 
61-1-13(11)(a) The Act defines "Nonissuer" as "not directly or 
indirectly for the benefit of the issuer." (Section 61-1-13(12)) The Act 
further provides that in a proceeding such as this one, "the burden of 
proving an...exception from a definition under section 61-1-13 is upon 
the person claiming the...exception." (Section 61-1-14.5) Thus, if in 
the proposed distribution there is any direct or indirect benefit to the 
issuer, Applicants do not qualify for registration by notification. 
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6. We find that the effect of the proposed distribution of all 
outstanding shares of each Issuer (subsidiary) as a partial liquidating 
dividend to each Applicant's (parent's) shareholders is to instantly 
transform a closely-held corporation into a publicly-held corporation 
with the minimal disclosure requirements that Registration by 
Notification entails. Since- the parent corporations' shares are held 
publicly by numerous shareholders, and since every qualifying shareholder 
of the parent would be distributed shares of the subsidiary, literally 
hundreds of thousands (in some cases millions) of subsidiary shares would 
become available for public trading. 
7. The parties stipulated that neither the parents nor subsidiaries 
"will receive any cash consideration, remuneration, or commissions, 
directly or indirectly, from the proposed distribution..." Respondents 
argue in their memorandum that any "benefit" must be monetary and that 
since it has been stipulated there is no monetary benefit, Applicants 
qualify for nonissuer distribution. We find such an argument 
unconvincing. Taking the clear and ordinary meaning of "direct or 
indirect benefit", we see no reason to limit it to monetary benefit. Had 
the legislature intended such a restriction, it could easily have 
specified it. None of the cases cited by Respondents on pages 5 and 6 of 
their memorandum deals with Registration by Notification and the question 
of monetary versus other types of benefits was not at issue. 
8. There are apparently no cases from any jurisdiction which have 
interpreted Section 1(b) of the Registration by Notification provision of 
the Uniform Securities Act. Factually, the cases most similar to the 
instant ones are the spin-off cases decided under the federal Securities 
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Act of 1933. In both S.E.C. v. Karwyn Industries, 326 F. Supp. 943 
(S.D.N.Y., 1971), and S.E.C. v. Datronics Engineers, 490 F.2d 250 {4th 
Cir., 1973)(cert. den. 1974), the courts were called upon to decide if a 
distribution of a subsidiary's shares as a dividend to parent's 
shareholders constituted a "sale" requiring registration. Whether a 
"sale" within the 1933 Act had occured depended upon whether the 
distribution was "for value." In both cases the Courts held that the 
creation of a public market for the shares constituted "value." Ve quote 
from Datronics: 
The spurious creation of a market whether intentional or 
incidental constituted a breach of the securities statutes. Each 
of the issuers by this wide spread of its stock became a 
publicly held corporation. In this process and in subsequent 
sales the investing public was not afforded the protection 
intended by the statutes...(490 F.2d at 254). 
9. Respondents argue that these cases are distinguishable, urging: 
(a) a distinction can be drawn between "value" and "benefit"; (b) in 
the federal cases there was a contract which required the parent to 
distribute the subsidiary's shares as a dividend, while such a course was 
discretionary in the instant cases; and (c) there is no claim of evasion 
of registration in the instant cases as there was in the federal cases. 
10. We find no sound basis for distinguishing the cases cited from 
the instant cases for the following reasons: (a) "Value" and "benefit" 
are substantially synonymous; if anything, "benefit" is a more 
comprehensive term than "value", (b) From the chain of facts described 
in paragraphs 1 and 2, supra; more particularly, the vague purposes for 
which the subsidiaries were formed, the brief time between creation of 
the subsidiary and distribution of its shares to parent, the minimal 
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capitalization of the subsidiaries, the absence of any apparent business 
reason for the partial liquidating dividends, we infer that the dividend 
was virtually as inevitable as if it had been contractually mandated. In 
addition, there is no need for a contract when the Parent has the 
ultimate authority to control the subsidiary by the exercise of the 
Parent's right as the holder of 1001 of the shares of the Subsidiary. 
(c) A primary objective of State and Federal securities laws is maximum 
disclosure. This objective would be subverted in the instant cases by 
the minimal disclosure of registration by notification just as it was by 
the lack of registration in the cases cited above. Respondents argue 
that "an order declaring Respondents to be issuers would have the effect 
of making these transactions exempt pursuant to Section 14(2)(1)." 
Whether the Division would construe this exemption to include a 
distribution of shares of a corporation other than those of the issuing 
corporation, we cannot say. Respondents have claimed no such exemption 
and that issue is not before us. 
11. We find that the creation of a public market for the shares of 
the subsidiaries is a benefit which would redound to both the Issuers and 
the.Applicants, the latter being, in our fact situation, tantamount to 
co-issuers. Even the Respondents seem to grudgingly concede the 
existence of a "benefit": 
The evidence at hand demonstrates rather that the proposed 
transactions are for the benefit of the shareholders of the 
parent corporation. (Respondents' Memorandum, p. 6) 
12. There being a benefit to the Issuers, the proposed transactions 
do not qualify as nonissuer distributions and Respondents are not 
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entitled to register by notification. In addition to these specific 
findings, we note that the burden of proving an exception from a 
definition under Section 61-1-13, such as "issuer" or "non-issuer", is 
upon the Respondents. (See 61-1-14.5) Respondents have failed to meet 
that burden. 
13. Having found that the proposed transactions do not qualify as 
non-issuer distributions, we need not determine if the shares were 
originally issued pursuant to valid exemptions. 
14. We fine that the issuance of stop orders prohibiting 
registration by notification of the instant Applications is in the public 
interest. The State has a valid interest in stopping the issuance of 
nundreds of thousands of public shares with the minimal disclosure 
inherent in registration by notification. 
15. Stop orders, pursuant to Section 61-l-12(g), should be issued 
denying the effectiveness of the registrations of Applicants. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAV 
1. The filing by the Division of Petitions and Orders to Show Cause 
in regard to the Applications in these matters is a "proceeding" within 
the meaning of Section 61-1-8(3), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. 
2. The direct or indirect "benefit" contemplated by Section 
61-1-13(12), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, may be something other 
than monetary. The creation of a market for shares where there 
previously was none constitutes a benefit. Both Applicants and Issuers 
in the instant cases stand to be benefited by the proposed distributions. 
3. Under Section 61-1-14.5, the burden of proving an exception from 
a definition under Section 61-1-13 is upon the person claiming the 
-11-
exception. Definitions in securities statutes have traditionally been 
interpreted broadly to require maximum disclosure. (See, e.g., S.E.C. v. 
North American Research & Development Corp., 42A F.2d 63 (2nd Cir. 1970) 
at 71.) 
4o A primary policy underlying the Utah Uniform Securities Act is to 
provide adequate disclosure to prospective shareholders. 
5. The entire scheme of the Parent in creating a Subsidiary, 
purchasing stock in that Subsidiary, and immediately thereafter 
distributing the stock in the Sunsidiary to the Parents1 shareholders 
which may then immediately retrade those securities in a newly created 
public market so integrally involves the actions of the Parent that it 
may be deemed an issuer, constructive issuer, or co-issuer of such 
securities, even though the technical identity of the controlled 
subsidiary is different. 
6. The terms "value" and "benefit" are substantially similar. 
7. In a proceeding to determine whether an Applicant is entitled to 
Registration by Notification, the entire chain of events must be viewed 
as a whole and inferences may be drawn therefrom. (See Harwyn, supra, 
326 F.Supp. at 954. ) 
8. Respondents do not qualify for Registration by Notification under 
Section 61-1-8, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. 
9. There being a finding that the issuance of Stop Orders in the 
instant Applications is in the public interest, Stop Orders should issue, 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Stop Orders issue denying the 
effectiveness of the Registration Statements of DRAKE EXPLORATION, Inc., 
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FUTECH, Inc., KOLYTECK, Inc., TPI, Inc., JCEALEY ENTERPRISES, Inc., 
TECHNOMEDICAL LABS, Inc. and LPI, Inc. 
DATED this 17th day of April, 1984. 
^Z7 
G. RITZ, Executive Director 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Orders are 
hereby accepted, confirmed and adopted by the Utah Securities Advisory 
Board this tf day of April, 1984. 
SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD: 
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EXHIBIT "F" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TPI, INC., LPI CORP., 
FUTECH, INC., MOLYTECH, INC., 
DRAKE EXPLORATION, INC., 
TECHNOMEDICAL LABS, INC., 
and KEALEY ENTERPRISES, INC., 
all Utah corporations, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION, 
and JOHN B. HIATT, its 
Director, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
BUSINESS REGULATION, DENNIS 
G. RITZ, its Executive 
Director, and the SECURITIES 
ADVISORY BOARD, 
Respondents. 
The above-captioned matter came on before this Court 
on appeal from the Order of the Utah Department of Business 
Regulation through the Executive Director of the Securities 
Regulation Division and no oral argument was presented, the 
Court being given a transcript of all of the proceedings before 
the Department together with the briefs filed by the Petitioners 
and Respondents. Based on all of the information submitted 
the Court now makes and enters its findings as follows. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO C 84-3455 
TPI, ET AL V, UTAH 
SECURITIES, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Pursuant to Section 23 of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act, 61-1-23 Utah Code Annotated (Sup, 1983), Petitioners 
TPI, Inc., LPI Corporation, Futech, Inc., Molytech, Inc, 
Drake Exploration, Inc., Technomedical Labs, Inc., and Kealey 
Enterprises, Inc., (all Petitioners) all Utah corporations, 
petitioned this Court to review and vacate the order of the 
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Business Regulation 
denying effectiveness of the registration statements of Petition-
ers. The petition contains twelve separate statements of 
error for review. Dennis G. Ritz, Executive Director of the 
Utah Department of Business Regulation, pursuant to Section 
61-1-23, certified the record by providing all relevant documents 
constituting the filings and evidence upon which the orders 
were entered in the administrative proceeding. 
On or about February 15, 1984, the Utah Securities Division 
received applications for registration from several corporations. 
Although each of the applications is independent of the other 
they all seek to take advantage of the same registration provi-
sions under the Act. They were all filed at the same time 
and in some instances the corporations share common officers 
and directors. Pursuant to the stipulation of attorneys of 
record this applications and related proceedings were consoli-
dated in the administrative proceeding. 
TPI, ET AL V. UTAH 
SECURITIES, ET AL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
In each instance, Petitioners are recently organized 
Utah corporations which soon after their organization undertook 
a public offering in reliance upon the so called "intrastate" 
exemption provided in Section 3(a)(11) promulgated under the 
Securities Act of 1933 and, therefore, no federal filing was 
made. Immediately following the completion of the Petitioners 
initial public offering, each Petitioner organized a new corpora-
tion and paid to that corporation from $1,000.00 to $2,750.00 
in exchange for from 750,000 to 2,750,000 shares in the new 
corporation. As a result of this transaction, each Petitioner 
became the parent of a wholly-owned subsidiary, the sole asset 
of which consisted of the cash paid by the parent for the 
stock m the subsidiary. For the purpose of clarifying the 
relationship between the parties, the Petitioner is sometimes 
hereinafter referred to as the Parent and the subsidiary is 
sometimes referred to as the Subsidiary. 
Immediately after the organization of the Subsidiaries 
and the issuance of their stock to the Parents, Petitioners 
filed Application for Registration by Notification pursuant 
to Section 61-1-8 Utah Code Annotated. Petitioners claimed 
that as nonissuers, they qualified for Registration by Notifica-
TPI, ET AL V. UTAH 
SECURITIES, ET AL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
tion under 61-l-8(b). In addition, Petitioners sought shareholder 
approval of a two-to-one partial liquidating dividend of the 
stock held by the Parent to its shareholders. Set forth in 
pages 3 and 4 of the Division's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Order are the relevant facts showing the relationship 
between each Parent and Subsidiary. 
Before 3:00 o'clock on February 17, 1984, (within the 
time requirement set forth in Section 61-1-8) the Division 
issued Petitions and Orders to Show Cause in each case ordering 
Petitioners to show cause why a Stop Order should not be issued 
denying the effectiveness of each registration. A time and 
date for a Pre-Hearing Conference was also set. At the Pre-Hear-
ing Conference Count III of the Petition was dismissed and 
the parties agreed that the seven applications could be consoli-
dated for purposes of the administrative proceeding. Arguments 
of the law were submitted by Memoranda to the Administrative 
Law Judge, Kent Walgren. 
On or about March 19, 1984, Walgren submitted his recommended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order to the Division. 
He concluded that Petitioners did not qualify as nonissuers 
within the definition provided in Section 61-1-13 Utah Code 
TPI, ET AL V„ UTAH 
SECURITIES, ET AL PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Annotated and, therefore, could not avail themselves of Registra-
tion by Notification. On or about April 19, 1984, the Executive 
Director and the Advisory Board of the Securities Division 
adopted the Findings of Walgren and issued Stop Orders denying 
the effectiveness of the registration statements of Petitioners. 
Petitioners now come before the District Court to have 
the Order vacated, the Petition of the Division dismissed 
with prejudice and the registration statements of Petitioners 
declared effective. 
Petitioners claim that the Executive Director committed 
twelve separate errors in denying the effectiveness of their 
registration statements. Each one of these errors is considered 
separately as follows. 
ERROR A 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS WERE WITHIN 
THE DEFINITION OF "NONISSUER" WAS IMPROPERLY PLACED ON PETITIONERS. 
It is Petitioners1 contention that as nonissuers, they 
qualify for Registration by Notification pursuant to Sec. 6-l-8(b). 
In the Division's Findings of Fact it concludes that Petitioners 
are nonissuers. The Division concluded inter alia that Petition-
ers have not met the burden of proof required by Section 61-1-14.5 
Utah Code Annotated (Sup. 1984). (See paragraphs 5 and 12 
of the Findings and paragraph 3 of the Conclusions). Section 
61-1-14 reads: 
TRX, ET AL V. UTAH 
SECURITIES, ET AL PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
In any proceeding under this chapter, civil, criminal, 
administrative, or judicial, the burden of proving an 
exemption under Sec. 61-1-14 or an exemption from a defini-
tion under Section 61-1-13 is upon the person claiming 
the exemption or exception* 
Count I of the Division's brief sets out its arguments 
for finding that Petitioners do not fall within the definition 
of nonissuer. The term "nonissuer" is defined in Section 
61-1-13(12) which provides % "Nonissuer means not directly 
or indirectly for the benefit of the issuer", Utah Code Annotated-
The Division contends that by giving a partial liquidating 
dividend, the Subsidiary will be transformed from a private 
company into a public company- The Division concludes that 
this will result in a benefit to the issuer, thereby disqualifying 
Petitioner as a nonissuer. At .no point does the Division's 
brief mention the burden of proof provided by Section 61-1-14-5. 
The burden of proof requirement of Section 61-1-14.5 
was apparently provided by Walgren in his recommended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Petitioners claim that they 
do not fall within the burden of proof required by Section 
61-1-14.5 because they are neither claiming an exemption under 
Section 14 nor an exception under Section 13. 
Petitioners claim that the wording of Section 61-1-8 
which provides for registration by notification is clear and 
cannot be construed to create a statutory undefined class 
of persons that are neither issuers nor nonissuers. 
TPI, ET AL V. UTAH 
SECURITIES, ET AL PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioners' argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. 
Section 61-1-8 provides no language that states that the terms 
nonissuer and issuer are exclusive. In addition, no one could 
conclude that the Act intended to exclude some securities 
from the definition of both nonissuer and issuer for the purpose 
of registration by notification. 
Petitioners also cite cases that they claim support the 
view that the definitions of issuer and nonissuer are exclusive. 
A reading of these cases does not provide any conclusive showing 
of the exclusivity of these terms 
Even though Petitioners claims are unpersuasive, they 
are correct in claiming that the Division incorrectly imposed 
the burden of proof required by Section 61-1-14.5. They clearly 
state that they are not claiming an exemption under Section 
14 nor an exemption under Section 13-
ERROR B 
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ERRED IN INCLUDING IN THE FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS, FACTS WHICH WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
Petitioners present ten specific examples where the Director 
erred in including facts that were not supported by the record. 
The Division has not erred regarding the following inclusion 
of facts: 
1. Paragraph 47: That if there is !a' or 'any1 benefit 
to the issuer, Petitioners do not fall within the definition 
TPI, ET AL V. UTAH 
SECURITIES, ET AL PAGE EIGHT MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of nonissuer; 
2, Paragraph 49s That the shares to be distributed 
by Petitioners would become immediately available for public 
trading and that the proposed transactions could "create" 
a public market for such shares; 
3o Paragraph 50: The Division's interpretation of case 
law; 
4. Paragraph 51: That the meanings of "value" and "benefit" 
are substantially synonomus; 
5. Paragraph 52: Characterizations of Petitioners proposed 
actions; and 
6. Paragraph 54: That the question of monetary versus 
other types of benefits was not at issue. 
Paragraph 46 of Petitioner's brief addresses the question 
of inclusion of the Section 14.5 burden of proof in the case. 
This question has been considered under Error A. 
Paragraphs 48 and 53 address the use of the phrase "minimal 
disclosure" by the Division when making reference to Registration 
by Notification. The Division uses the phrase "minimal disclosure" 
inconsistently. In Paragraph 6 of its Findings it concludes 
that the partial liquidation dividend will transform the Subsidi-
aries into publicly-held corporations. This would occur with 
the minimal disclosure inherent in Registration by Notification* 
TRI, ET AL V. UTAH 
SECURITIES, ET AL PAGE NINE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Division then states in Paragraph 14 that it is in the 
public interest to prohibit registration which entails minimal 
disclosure. 
The Division is using this phrase loosely. There is 
no "minimal disclosure" mentioned in Section 61-1-8. One 
must assume that the Division was referring to the fact that 
under Registration by Notification there will be a lesser 
disclosure than otherwise required. It is, therefore, in 
the public interest to scrutinize applications that involve 
Registration by Notification. But in order to deny a registra-
tion statement based on public policy, the Division must 
apparently do so pursuant to Section 61-1-6(1) or 6-1-12(1) 
or 61-1-24(2). 
Section 61-1-6(1) provides that the director may deny 
registration based on public policy, but, in addition, it 
is limited to several specific circumstances under which such 
denial would be justified. Section 61-1-12(1) provides that 
a stop order may be issued in the public interest denying 
the effectiveness of any registration statement, but just 
as 61-1-6 requires, specific allegations must be made. 
As Petitioners point out in Paragraph 55, the Division 
could claim that it may make orders in the public interest 
under Section 61-1-23. Petitioners also claim that the burden 
of proof concerning public interest would be upon the Division. 
TPI, ET AL V. UTAH 
SECURITIES, ET AL PAGE TEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Division made no specific reference to any section 
of the Code while making these statements. It would be appropri-
ate to remand the Order and require the use of the phrase 
"minimal disclosure" with reference to the public interest 
be used in the context of a specific statute rather than in 
a general way. The use of the phrase "minimal disclosure" 
was not a significant element of the Division's Findings, 
however. 
ERROR C 
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ERRED IN INCLUDING IN THE FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WHICH WERE NOT PART OF 
THE RECORD. 
Petitioners repeat their claims regarding the burden 
of proof imposed by Section 61-1-14.5 and the use of the phrase 
"minimal disclosure", the above discussion of these issues 
is applicable to this statement of error. 
ERROR D 
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ERRED IN INCLUDING IN THE FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS ISSUES NEVER PREVIOUSLY RAISED. 
Petitioners again raised the burden of proof and "minimal 
disclosure" issues and the above discussion in that regard 
is applicable. 
In Paragraph 65 Petitioners claim that the Director erred 
by finding that no determination was necessary regarding Count 
II of the Division's brief. Count II reads: "Respondent 
TPI, ET AL V. UTAH 
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cannot rely upon the exemptions contained in Section 61-1-14(2)(a) 
and 61-1-14(2) (n) .H Because the Director found that Petitioners 
did not qualify as nonissuers, there was no need to continue 
to determine if the shares were originally issued pursuant 
to a valid exemption. (See Paragraph 13 of the Findings) 
It would be an unreasonable expense of the Director's 
resources to decide a secondary issue of law, when the determina-
tion of a threshhold issue had already made the secondary 
issue moot. If upon remand, the Director were to find that 
Petitioners qualified as nonissuers, then it would be appropri-
ate and a requisite for the Director to decide the secondary 
issue as presented in Count II. 
In addition, if the Director were to consider the secondary 
issue, he could then impose the burden of proof as required 
by Section 61-1-14.5, because at this point Petitioners are 
claiming an exemption under Section 61-1-14. 
ERROR E 
THE DIRECTOR ERRED IN MAKING ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND THEREBY PREJUDICING PETITIONERS CASES BEFORE THE DEPART-
MENT. 
Petitioners1 first claim is that the Director erred in 
finding that the instant matters were proceedings within the 
meaning of Section 61-1-8(3). They also claim that the issue 
was raised at the Pre-Hearing Conference, but provide no evidence 
of that fact. 
TPI, ET AL V. UTAH 
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There is no claim concerning the fashion in which or 
degree to which this conclusion has damaged Petitioners; or 
how they might have approached their case differently. In 
addition, the Director's conclusion is correct based on the 
evidence presented and the reading of the Act* 
ERROR F 
THE DIRECTOR ERRED BY ISSUING AN ORDER WITHOUT GIVING 
PETITIONERS PRIOR NOTICE AND THEREBY A HEARING AS REQUIRED BY 
SECTION 12 OF THE ACT. 
Petitioners claim that they were denied relief under 
Section 61-1-12(2) and (3). Section 61-1-12(2) reads in parts 
"Upon the entry of the order, the Division shall promptly 
notify each person specified in Subsection (3) that it has 
been entered and that of the reasons therefor and that within 
fifteen business days after the receipt of a written request 
the matter will be set down for a hearing," Petitioners have 
made no showing that they attempted to request a hearing and 
were denied, or that they did not receive a timely notice 
of the Director's Order. 
Section 61-1-12(3) providess "No Stop Order may be entered 
under any portion of this section cce without: "(a) appropriate 
prior notice ... ; (b) opportunity for hearings,- and (c) written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law." The Stop Order 
was not issued until Petitioners had the opportunity to meet 
TPI, ET AL V, UTAH 
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at a Pre-Hearing Conference where they consented to presenting 
their arguments by Memorandum to the Division, which subsequently 
made a good faith decision regarding Petitioners1 application. 
In this Courts judgment based on the evidence before 
the Court there is no basis for this statement of error. 
ERROR G 
THE DIRECTOR ERRED IN ISSUING AN ORDER WITHOUT GIVING 
ISSUERS PRIOR NOTICE AND THEREBY THE OPPOTUNITY FOR A HEARING 
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 12 OF THE ACT. 
The issues of this claim are the same as in Error F and 
the reasoning applied thereunder is equally applicable here. 
ERROR H 
THE DIRECTOR WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO CLASSIFY PETITIONERS 
AS "CO-ISSUERS" AND AS "CONSTRUCTIVE" ISSUERS. 
Petitioners' argument is based on their claim that the 
Act contains definitions of "issuer" and "nonissuer" which 
were intended to be exclusive. This issue was addressed under 
Error A. As the conclusion under Error A states, Petitioners 
do not provide convincing evidence that this reading of the 
statute is accurate, and therefore the claim fails. 
ERROR I 
THE DIRECTOR ERRED IN REFUSING TO DECIDE THE ISSUE PRESENTED 
IN COUNT II OF THE PETITION OF THE DIVISION 
This issue was discussed above in the consideration of 
Error D, further consideration is also justified at this point. 
TPI, ET AL V- UTAH 
SECURITIES, ET AL PAGE FOURTEEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioners specifically refer to 61-1-12(2) which provides 
in parts "If a hearing is requested or ordered, *.. the Executive 
Director, ... may affirm, modify, or vacate the order or extend 
it until final determination." It is Petitioners1 contention 
that this language mandates a ruling on Count II of the Petition 
of the Division. 
Clearly it was within the power of the Director to refuse 
to decide the allegations contained in Count II. The language 
of the statute says that the Director "may" affirm, modify 
or vacate. If it were not within the power of the Director 
to choose not to act, the statute would likely read "shall" 
affirm, modify or vacate. 
As argued above, under Error D, it would be unreasonable 
to impose upon the Director an obligation to decide all secondary 
issues that were made moot by a controling threshhold issue. 
ERROR J 
THE RULINGS OF THE EXECUTIVE SHOULD BE VACATED DUE TO 
THE UNCONSCIONABLE AND PREJUDICIAL DELAY IN THEIR ISSUANCE. 
The order of the Director was issued twenty-eight business 
days after the hearing. According to Petitioners, this delay 
was in violation of Section 12(2) which gave the Director 
ten business days. This additional delay could be called 
unfortunate, but not unconscionable or prejudicial. 
TPI, ET AL V. UTAH 
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This was a complicated case, it involved seven separate 
applications for Registration by Notification, Petitioners 
have presented no evidence that their case was prejudiced 
or that they were injured by the delay. Without such evidence 
one must assume that the Director acted in good faith and 
the delay was not unconscionable and did not prejudice Petitioners1 
case. 
ERROR K 
THE RULING SHOULD BE VACATED DUE TO THE PREJUDICE AND 
BIAS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
AND THE DEPARTMENT. 
With the exception of the fact that these officials came 
to somewhat different conclusions regarding the facts and 
law, Petitioners present no evidence of prejudice or bias. 
These officials might have made errors in interpreting the 
law, which might be a basis for remand, but there is no showing 
of bias or prejudice. 
ERROR L 
THE RULING SHOULD BE VACATED BECAUSE THE DIRECTOR DID 
NOT ACT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. 
As discussed above, under Error C, the Director might 
be more careful in choosing his language regarding public 
interest. But, if the Director chooses to claim that it is 
in the public interest to deny the registration of Petitioners, 
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he may do so. His compliance in accordance with the Code 
making his claim under Section 61-1-6(1), 61-1-12(1) or Section 
61-1-24(2) is sufficient. 
This Court after having carefully reviewed the material 
presented in the briefs as well as the record as certified 
finds that the Division imposed a burden of proof error when 
it need not have and the Division should directly have addressed 
itself to the Petitioners1 central claim and not so apply 
that requirement. However, this error is not considered by 
this Court of sufficient magnitude nor weight to justify a 
remanding of this matter to the Division for reconsideration 
along the lines indicated but to the contrary this Court affirms 
the action taken by the Executive Director of the Utah Department 
of Business Regulation and this Court does not vacate that 
order. 
Dated this ^ $ day of January, 1985. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to W. Sterling Mason, 
Jr., Esq., Attorney at Law, 143 East 900 South, Second Floor, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 and to John C. Baldwin, Esq., 
Assistant Attorney General, Room 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84114, this ^O day of January, 1985. 
EXHIBIT "Gff 
LORA C. SIEGLER 
Uf. STERLING fin SON JR. 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS 
143 E. 900 S., 2d Fl. 
Sa • t Lake C t t > , Utah 84111 
(801) 363-6247 
(SOD 484-4567 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TECHNOMEDICAL LABS, INC., a 
U t ah Cor p or a t i on , an d 
C ONN E CTI ON S MA R K ETIN G C 0 R P . , a 
N e v a d a C orp. (formerly 
TPI. INC.), 
Plaintiffs, and Appe 1 1 an t s 
v . 
UTA H S E C U RITI E S DIVI SI ON , 
and JOHN B. HIATT, its 
Direct or, UTAH DEPARTMENT 0 F 
B USINE S S R E G ULATI ON, 
DENNIS G. RITZ, it s Ex e c ut ive 
Direct or, an d the SECURITIES 
ADVISORY BOARD, 
Defendants and Respondents 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CIVIL NO. C 84-345S 
Notice is hereby given that TECHNOMEDICAL LABS, IHC. 
an d CONNECTIONS MARKETING CORP., plaintiff and succe ssor i n 
interest to plaintiff above named, hereby appeal to the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the Memorandum 
Decision entered in this ac t i on on Jan uar >• 30 , 1985. 
Dated this 2a th da • of Februarv, 1935. 
Lor a C. Siegler 
attorney tor Appellants 
143 E. 900 So. 
Sal t L a k Ci t /, Utah 84111 
k80n 363-6247 
I hereb> cert ifv that a true and correct copv of the 
attached Notice of nppeal was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
26th da- of February, 1*85, to John Baldwin, nssistspt 
Httorne* General at the Utah State Capital, Salt Lake C«t*, 
Utah, as counsel cf record for the Utah Securities Division, 
to John B. Htatt, Director of the Utah Securities Division 
at 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake Ctt>, Utah; to Dennis G. 
Ritz, the Executive Director of the Utah Department of 
Business Pequlat on, for himself and for the Department, at 
1*0 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah; and to the 
Securities Advisor/ Board at 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake 
Citv, Utah. 
^Put^C. 
Lor a C. Sieqler 
